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I. INTRODUCTION
Consider the case of a woman named Martha, a middle-aged African
American who is a relatively well-paid secretary for a large manufacturing
corporation. -Before she began her first workday, the company required her
to sign an employment agreement. Later, having watched younger, white
secretaries receive promotions instead of herself, Martha believed that her
employer promoted secretaries on the basis of age and race, contrary to her
interests. After consulting the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) about her rights, Martha received clearance to bring race and age
discrimination claims against her employer.
In response, the company filed a motion to compel arbitration. The
supporting memorandum noted that Martha's employment agreement
contained a clause requiring arbitration of employment disputes and that this
employee was aware and understood such terms. The gavel falls in the
employer's favor, and Martha must go behind closed doors to exert her
statutory right to be free of impermissible discrimination. Arbitrators, perhaps
ones selected by the company, will hear the evidence and, barring any
extraordinary aberrations in the arbitral process, courts will be bound under
federal arbitration law to enforce the predispute agreement. Martha's statutory
claims, despite public interest against certain types of discrimination in
employment, will be resolved in the privacy of arbitration and without some
of the benefits of litigation.
Martha's situation recently has become an increasingly common
phenomenon. 1 When Congress passed the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)2 in
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1 The "phenomenon" is demonstrated by employers who increasingly rely on
employment contracts with broad arbitration clauses and require their employees to sign
them. During 1996, one study demonstrated that of all employers who used mandatory
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the mid-1920s, the U.S. judicial system began to look favorably upon
employment arbitration, 85 % of them had implemented their plan during the preceding four
years. See Joseph R. Grodin, Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Claims: Doctrine
and Policy in the Wake of Gilmer, 14 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 1, 5 n.6 (1996). Although the
idea of labor contracts is not new insofar as union representation and employment-at-term
positions are concerned, the idea is novel as it extends to include nonunion, low-ranking,
at-will employees. While the employer's ability to restrict resolution of discrimination
claims to an arbitral forum is an issue at all levels, the situation is particularly acute when
the contract is made with low-ranking, less-educated employees who may lack bargaining
power to affect the employment contract's terms.
Today, employment dispute arbitration often arises in the securities industry due to the
arbitration clause present in the Form U-4, which the employee must execute before
receiving authorization to become a securities representative. See Cremin v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 957 F. Supp. 1460, 1462-1464, 1466-1470 (N.D. Ill. 1997)
(discussing the Form U-4 and New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and National Association
of Securities Dealers (NASD) registration procedures for securities representatives); see
also infra note 141 and accompanying text (discussing the Form U-4 at issue in Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991)).
Following the wake of Gilmer, employers outside the securities field have begun to
compel their nonunion employees to arbitrate employment discrimination claims and
disputes. See, e.g., Miller v. Public Storage Management, Inc., 121 F.3d 215 (5th Cir.
1997) (affirming lower court's order requiring former property manager to arbitrate her
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) claims); EEOC v. Frank's Nursery & Crafts, Inc.,
966 F. Supp. 500 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (compelling former secretary to arbitrate her Title VII
claims); Golenia v. Bob Baker Toyota, 915 F. Supp. 201 (S.D. Cal. 1996) (compelling
former car salesman to arbitrate his ADA claims); Powers v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.,
923 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (compelling former television news reporter to arbitrate
his state law discrimination claims); Scott v. Farm Family Life Ins. Co., 827 F. Supp. 76
(D. Mass. 1993) (compelling former insurance salesperson to arbitrate her Tide VII
claims). Some of these contracts have required high-ranking and educated employees to
arbitrate their claims. See Crawford v. West Jersey Health Sys., 847 F. Supp. 1232
(D.N.J. 1994) (compelling physician to arbitrate her Age Discrimination in Employment
Act (ADEA) and Title VII claims); DiCrisci v. Lyndon Guar. Bank, 807 F. Supp. 947
(W.D.N.Y. 1992) (compelling former operations manager for financial institution to
arbitrate Title VII claims). Other contracts have required arbitration of discrimination
claims even when the employee held a low-paying position that required minimal
experience or education. See Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir.
1997) (affirming order to compel arbitration of former security guard's Title VII claims);
Shankle v. B-G Maintenance Management of Colorado, Inc., No. 96 N 2932, 1997 WL
416405, at *1 (D. Colo. Mar. 24, 1997) (declining to compel arbitration of nonunion
janitor's Title VII, ADA, and ADEA claims).
Note that the issue of well-educated and knowledgeable employees also arises in the
securities industry. See Maye v. Smith Barney Inc., 897 F. Supp. 100 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)
(compelling arbitration of the Title VII claims of two twenty-one year old securities
employees whose highest educational levels were General Equivalency Diplomas).
2 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1994).
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predispute arbitration agreements. 3 Enforcement under the Act, however, in
the early years was limited mainly to the commercial arena when the Supreme
Court explicitly denied arbitration of statutory claims.4 During the 1980s, the
Court reversed its position on the arbitrability of statutory claims. 5 Ultimately,
the Court announced in 1991 its willingness to enforce arbitration of statutory
employment discrimination claims under the Federal Arbitration Act.6 The
wake of this decision has resulted in a tidal wave of employment contracts
containing arbitration clauses that encompass discrimination disputes. 7 The
reaction to the proliferation is a rising outcry of commentators against the
unfairness of such practices. 8
3 The FAA "establishes by statute the desirability of arbitration as an alternative to the
complications of litigation" and stresses the "need for avoiding the delay and expense of
litigation." Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 431 (1953) (citing H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 1-2
(1924) and S. REP. No. 68-536, at 3 (1924)).
4 See id. at 438 (noting that the specific statutory rights that Congress guaranteed
individuals under the Securities Act could not be reconciled with the general policy of
promoting efficient commercial dispute resolution through arbitration).
5 See infra notes 50-68 and accompanying text.
6 See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 20.
7 See supra note 1. This onslaught of employment arbitration agreements coincides
with a massive increase in the number of employment discrimination cases filed against
employers. See Stephen L. Hayford & Michael J. Evers, The Interaction Between the
Employment-at-Will Doctrine and Employer-Employee Agreements to Arbitrate Statutory
Fair Employment Practices Claims: Difficult Choices for At-Will Employers, 73 N.C. L.
REV. 443, 447 n.3 (1995) (noting that the number of employment discrimination claims
filed in 1991 was five times the number filed in 1971). The fear is that with "three million
terminations each year, the potential result is a flooding" of discrimination claims by
disgruntled employees. Mark Berger, Can Employment Law Arbitration Work?, 61 UMKC
L. REV. 693, 695 (1993) (footnote omitted).
8 See, e.g., Berger, supra note 7 (arguing for modification of arbitral procedures to
recognize the unique demands of employment discrimination claims); Walter J.
Gershenfeld, Pre-Employment Dispute Arbitration Agreements: Yes, No and Maybe, 14
HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 245 (1996) (arguing for quality standards in employment arbitration
procedures); Sharona Hoffman, Mandatory Arbitration: Alternative Dispute Resolution or
Coercive Dispute Suppression?, 17 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 131 (1996) (arguing that
mandatory arbitration agreements unilaterally imposed by employers are unenforceable);
Lewis Maltby, Paradise Lost-How the Gilmer Court Lost the Opportunity for Alternative
Dispute Resolution to Improve Civil Rights, 12 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTs. 1 (1994)
(suggesting that the Gilmer majority opinion failed to provide meaningful guidelines for
arbitral resolution of employment discrimination claims).
Additionally, the EEOC continues to express a strong position against employer
imposed mandatory arbitration. See Mark Hansen, Contract Disputes, A.B.A. J., Sept.
1997, at 26.
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This Article suggests that the purposes and procedures of commercial
arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act must be balanced against
competing concerns of public interest and employee remedies when federal
employment discrimination claims are asserted. Part II examines the evolution
of federal arbitration law as it developed through Supreme Court decisions
that permitted parties to arbitrate statutory claims. Part III addresses the
relevant federal employment antidiscrimination statutes as well as the
evolution of the Court's treatment concerning the arbitrability of disputes
based on these statutes. This Part also will examine how Gilmer altered the
Court's prior stance and that decision's subsequent effect on analyses in the
lower courts. Part IV proposes legislative amendments to federal arbitration
law to ensure that contractual arbitration procedures sufficiently meet the
special concerns of statutory antidiscrimination protection. This Part addresses
several key issues that continue to arise in court cases challenging employment
arbitration and offers balanced proposals to resolve these issues in the interest
of both arbitrability and employee concerns by developing a new "hybrid"
theory of employment arbitration. The final Part notes that while arbitration
of employment disputes should, and is likely to, continue, the differences
between disputes arising from employment and from ordinary commercial
transactions call for a judicial and legislative clarification of the parameters of
employment arbitration, because acceptable and consistent standards, rules,
and limitations are not yet enumerated statutorily or in the case law.
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION LAW9
In 1925, Congress passed the United States Arbitration Act, commonly
known as the Federal Arbitration Act. 1o The purpose of this legislation was
9 In addition to the federal law of arbitration embodied by the FAA, the majority of
states have adopted the Uniform Arbitration Act (UAA). See UNi. ARBITRAnTON ACT
§§ 1-25, 7 U.L.A. 1 (1997 & Supp. 11998). The UAA was modeled on the FAA and is
substantially similar to the federal act in that both address the minimum standards for
arbitration agreement enforcement and grounds for review of an award. Compare Federal
Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-2, 10-11 (1994), with UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT §§ 1-2,
11-13. While this article focuses upon federal arbitration law and its application to enforce
employment contract arbitration agreements, the UAA is relevant to parts of the discussion
and will be addressed appropriately. The most notable comparison will arise insofar as the
UAA provides that the act "applies to arbitration agreements between employers and
employees." See UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 1, 7 U.L.A. 1, 1 (1997); see also infra note
197.
10 For an interesting and in-depth analysis of the history of the passage of the FAA
and whether the FAA was intended to apply to employment contracts, see generally
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to enforce predispute arbitration agreements by "reversing centuries of
judicial hostility to arbitration agreements" and "to place arbitiation
agreements 'upon the same footing as other contracts."' 11 Prior to passage of
the FAA, parties could rely upon an agreement to arbitrate entered into after
the dispute arose, but enforcement of an arbitration agreement executed prior
to an existing dispute remained doubtful. The FAA sought to alleviate
concerns about enforcement of predispute agreements.
Under section 2 of the FAA, a written agreement to arbitrate a dispute is
"valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law
or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 12 The FAA governs
agreements within "any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce." 13 Section 1 of the FAA defines
"commerce" as "commerce among the several States or with foreign
nations," but explicitly states that "nothing herein contained shall apply to
contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of
workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." 14 Generally, the
accepted view of the section 2 "commerce" requirement was to empower the
FAA to reach the full extent of Congress's commerce clause power. 15 The
limitation in section 1 concerning certain employment contracts arose as the
result of effective lobbying by the Seamen's Union. 16
Matthew W. Finldn, "Workers' Contracts" Under the United States Arbitration Act: An
Essay in Historical Clarification, 17 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 282 (1996) (arguing
that the history surrounding the passage of the FAA implies that it was not intended to
apply to employment contracts in general).
11 Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510-511 (1974) (quoting H.R. REP.
No. 68-96, at 1-2 (1924)).
12 9 U.S.C. § 2. "The effect of the section is to create a body of federal substantive
law of arbitrability, applicable to any arbitration agreement within the coverage of the
Act." Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
13 9 U.S.C. § 2.
14 Id. § 1. Note that section 2 uses the words "involving commerce" while section 1
uses the phrase "engaged ... in interstate commerce." Id. §§ 1, 2. A distinction has been
drawn for this difference in phraseology and is discussed infra, notes 200 and 201 and
accompanying text.
15 " T]his Court has previously described the Act's reach expansively as coinciding
with that of the Commerce Clause." Allied-Bruce Terminex Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S.
265, 274 (1995) (citations omitted) (holding that section 2's interstate commerce language
should be read broadly). This expansive view holds even though the "Congress that passed
the Act in 1925 might well have thought the Commerce Clause did not stretch as far as has
turned out to be [the case]." Id. at 275.
16 When the Act was passed, seamen were the sole employees required by federal law
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Once the first two requirements of the FAA are satisfied, a court is bound
to honor the agreement to arbitrate. Section 3 of the FAA requires a court to
stay judicial proceedings concerning any subject of the arbitration agreement
and refer such issue to arbitration, 17 so long as the scope of the arbitration
clause encompasses the issue. Additionally, when one party subject to the
arbitration clause demonstrates a "failure, neglect, or refusal" to arbitrate as
agreed, the other party may petition the court to compel arbitration in
accordance with the parties' intention. 18 Although issues of arbitrability are
for the court to decide as an initial matter, 19 a court may not review the merits
of the dispute when considering whether to compel arbitration. 20 All other
issues, including whether parties intended to arbitrate a particular dispute, are
resolved in favor of arbitrability. 21 When the court holds that the dispute is
arbitrable under the terms of the contract, the court must submit the issue to
to execute individual employment agreements. See Finkin, supra note 10, at 286. The
International Seamen's Union expressed concern over the ease with which arbitration
clauses could be placed in these mandated contracts and the resulting detriment to seamen
who would be forced to arbitrate their claims and rights, particularly under the Seamen's
Act which guaranteed wage, food, and damage rights. See id. at 286-287. During a Senate
Judiciary Committee meeting on the passage of the FAA, a representative of the American
Bar Association (ABA), whose organization had drafted the proposed act, went on record
as saying that the FAA was not
an act referring to labor disputes, at all. It is purely an act to give the merchants the
right or the privilege of sitting down and agreeing with each other as to what their
damages are, if they want to do it. Now, that is all there is in this.
Id. at 285.
While these comments would insinuate that all employment contracts are exempt from
coverage by the FAA, a narrow interpretation of the FAA has found otherwise. See infra
notes 198-202 and accompanying text.
17 See 9 U.S.C. § 3.
18Id. §4.
19 See First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995).
"[A]rbitration is simply a matter of contract between the parties; it is a way to resolve
those disputes-but only those disputes-that the parties have agreed to submit to
arbitration." Id. When a court decides whether an issue is arbitrable, it "should apply
ordinary state-law principles that govern the formation of contracts." Id. at 944; see also
Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 202-203 (1956) (holding that
enforcement of an arbitration agreement depended on state law). Note, however, that
parties may agree to submit issues of arbitrability to the arbitrator. See First Options, 514
U.S. at 942.
20 See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984) (stating that courts act only
to enforce arbitration agreements rather than consider the merits of the underlying dispute).
21 See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626
(1985).
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arbitration in accordance with the parties' predispute agreement and stay any
further judicial intervention pending arbitration.22
Once a dispute has been submitted to arbitration, the parties present the
dispute to one or more arbitrators. Because arbitration is contractual in nature,
the parties may agree in advance upon the specific issues that will be referable
to arbitration, the authority of the arbitrator, remedies available, selection of
arbitrators, and the procedures to be employed.23 Often, the parties will adopt
the arbitration rules of a particular arbitration service and select the
arbitrator(s) from the lists that such services maintain. 24 The arbitrator will
review the case and hear arguments under informal rules of procedure and
evidence. 25 Following the close of arbitral proceedings, the arbitrator will
render an award, 26 which normally will not be written. 27 After the award is
presented, the parties may either choose to comply voluntarily with the award,
22 See 9 U.S.C. § 3.
23 Note that some limitations are placed on parties' ability to structure arbitration. See
DiCrisci v. Lyndon Guar. Bank, 807 F. Supp. 947, 953-954 (W.D.N.Y. 1992) (severing
and staying issue of punitive damages from arbitral dispute due to New York law
prohibiting arbitrators from granting punitive damages).
24 The most common arbitration service is the American Arbitration Association
(AAA), which publishes arbitration guidelines and rules and offers a variety of arbitration
services. Another similar service is JAMS/Endispute. For commentary on arbitration
services and their procedures, see generally Gershenfeld, supra note 8. Although these
services can provide arbitrators to hear disputes, parties often agree to utilize the expertise
of persons within the industry and will select arbitrators from among the ranks of their
employment field. See Andros Compania Maritima v. Marc Rich & Co., 579 F.2d 691,
701 (2d Cir. 1978) (noting that a principal advantage of arbitration is the parties' ability to
select the arbitrator, including members of the industry).
2 5 While arbitration employs procedural and evidentiary rules in the resolution of
disputes, the rules are informal and less strict than rules used within the judicial system and
may be structured by the contracting parties. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436-437
(1953).
26 The arbitrator's authority to render a particular award is constrained only by his
authority under the contract and the FAA, such that the arbitrator may award remedies that
are different in kind from what a party would expect if the dispute had been conducted
within a judicial setting. See Hill v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 814 F.2d 1192, 1195 (7th Cir.
1987).
27 "Arbitrators have no obligation to the court to give their reasons for an award. To
require opinions free of ambiguity may lead arbitrators to play it safe by writing no
supporting opinions." United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S.
593, 598 (1960) (footnotes omitted). The rationale for this phenomenon is that a written
award may demonstrate that an arbitral decision was based on erroneous grounds, which
a reviewing court could find sufficient to order correction, modification, or vacatur. See
Sobel v. Hertz, Warner & Co., 469 F.2d 1211, 1214 (2d Cir. 1972).
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seek confirmation, or attempt to obtain judicial review to modify, correct, or
vacate the award.
When an arbitral award is rendered, a court is limited to a narrow review
of the arbitral process and may not retry the merits of the case. 28 Section 9 of
the FAA requires the court, upon petition by a party, to confirm and enforce
an arbitral award. 29 Although the court may vacate, 30 modify, or correct 31 an
arbitral award, 32 judicial review is limited to "whether the [arbitration] panel
discharged its duty as measured by the more modest procedural and
evidentiary strictures of arbitration." 33 The court is limited to determining
whether the arbitrator interpreted the contract in accordance with his
authority34 and cannot review the merits of the underlying dispute even when
28 Judicial review of arbitration is limited by section 11 of the FAA and a court may
only modify or correct an award under limited circumstances, such as when the award is
obtained by fraud, when the arbitrator has been biased or exceeded her authority, or
improperly conducted the hearings. See 9 U.S.C. § 11 (1994).
29 " [A]t any time within one year after the [arbitral] award is made any party to the
arbitration may apply to the court so specified for an order confirming the award, and
thereupon the court must grant such an order unless the award is vacated, modified, or
corrected." Id. § 9 (emphasis added).
30 See id. § 10. A court may vacate an award when (1) the award was obtained by
corruption, fraud, or undue means, (2) evidence demonstrates that the arbitrator was
biased, (3) the arbitrator engaged in prejudicial misconduct by refusing to postpone a
hearing or refusing to hear pertinent evidence, or (4) the arbitrator exceeded his powers
under the contract or imperfectly executed a mutual, final, and definite award. See id.
31 Modification or correction of an arbitral award is made under section 11, when (1)
there is an evident material miscalculation or evident material mistake in the award, (2) the
arbitrator has rendered a decision on a matter not submitted to arbitration, or (3) the form
of the award is imperfect. See id. § 11.
32 Additional, nonstatutory grounds exist for arbitral award correction, modification,
or vacatur. The most common ground is manifest disregard of the law, which is used when
an arbitrator has the correct law before her and knowingly refuses to apply it. See Wilko
v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436-437, 440 (1953). Additionally, some courts recognize public
policy exceptions and arbitrary and capricious awards as grounds for altering or vacating
an arbitral award. See Brown v. Rauscher Pierce Refsnes, Inc., 994 F.2d 775, 779 (11th
Cir. 1993). Nonstatutory grounds for setting aside an arbitral award have not been adopted
uniformly among the jurisdictions.
33 Forsythe Int'l, S.A. v. Gibbs Oil Co., 915 F.2d 1017, 1021 (5th Cir. 1990) (noting
also that judicial review of commercial arbitration awards is limited to sections 10 and 11
of the FAA).
34 A reviewing court "do[es] not sit to hear claims of factual or legal error by an
arbitrator as an appellate court does in reviewing decisions of lower courts." United
Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987). Additionally, "so far
as the arbitrator's decision concerns the construction of the contract, the courts have no
business overruling him because their interpretation of the contract is different from his."
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a party alleges that the award rests on misinterpretation of the facts. 35 Thus,
in all but the narrowest of circumstances when an arbitrator commits an
egregious error during the arbitral process, an arbitration award is "final" and
virtually unassailable in court.
The FAA demonstrates a "liberal federal policy favoring arbitration
agreements" 36 as a means of providing a "speedy, efficient process for
resolving disputes." 37 Presumptions in favor of arbitrability, informal
proceedings, and limited judicial review serve both to expedite dispute
resolution and to contain the cost of litigation. These potential advantages do
not require a party to arbitration to waive any substantive rights or remedies
by agreeing to arbitration because that alternative to litigation is merely a
procedural waiver representing a selection of the arbitral forum in place of a
judicial one. 38 Thus, a party who agrees to binding arbitration should expect
the courts to compel the party to honor the agreement in the event of a dispute
and should realize that the opportunity for substantial judicial review of the
merits of any such dispute is unlikely.
Throughout the years, the FAA has steadily established a secure footing
in American jurisprudence. An impressive sequence of Supreme Court cases
established the enforcement of arbitration agreements, demonstrating the
liberal federal attitude favoring arbitration as an alternative to litigation. As
early as 1953, the Court found an opportunity to express the "liberal policy"
toward arbitration even while denying the arbitrability of a Securities Act of
United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 599 (1960).
35 "The courts are not authorized to reconsider the merits of an award even though the
parties may allege that the award rests on errors of fact or on misinterpretation of the
contract." Misco, 484 U.S. at 36. Judicial review of arbitral awards is strict and narrow
because "[a] rule of judicial review under which courts would independently redetermine
the scope of an arbitration agreement already interpreted by the arbitrator would invite
frequent and protracted judicial proceedings, contravening the parties' expectations of
finality." Advanced Micro Devices v. Intel Corp., 885 P.2d 994, 1000 (Cal. 1994) (citing
Van Tassel v. Superior Court, 526 P.2d 969 (1974)).
36 Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
37 Jardine Matheson & Co. v. Saita Shipping, Ltd., 712 F. Supp. 423, 429 (S.D.N.Y.
1989).
38 "An agreement to arbitrate before a specified tribunal is... a specialized kind of
forum-selection clause that posits not only the situs of suit but also the procedure to be used
in resolving the dispute." Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519 (1974). The
Supreme Court has ruled that the "streamlined procedures of arbitration do not entail any
consequential restriction on substantive rights." Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon,
482 U.S. 220, 232 (1987) (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 633-634 (1985)).
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1933 (Securities Act)3 9 claim.40 Although the Court would not then permit
waiver of a judicial forum to resolve statutory Securities Act disputes in
arbitration, 41 it nonetheless provided a strong endorsement of commercial
arbitration in other types of nonstatutory transactions. 42
The Court seven years after Wilko developed a strong. policy in favor of
labor arbitration. 4 3 The Steelworkers Trilogy44 established an unequivocal
judicial preference for the arbitral settlement of industrial disputes between
39 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1994 & Supp. 111996).
40 See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 431 (1953). But see Moran v. Paine, Webber,
Jackson & Curtis, 389 F.2d 242, 246 (3d Cir. 1968) (holding that statutory rights under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 could be enforced by arbitration provided that the parties
had agreed to arbitrate a pre-existing dispute and had proceeded to obtain a final award).
41 See Wilko, 346 U.S. at 435. "When the security buyer, prior to any
violation ... waives his right to sue in courts, he gives up more than would a participant
in other business transactions [and]... thus surrenders one of the advantages the
[Securities] Act gives him." Id. When a party chooses to arbitrate the statutory claims, the
"effectiveness... [of the Securities Act's advantages] is lessened in arbitration as
compared to judicial proceedings." Id. The Court found that if the claims were submitted
to arbitration, the findings would have to be "applied by the arbitrators without judicial
instruction on the law.... [T]heir award may be made without explanation... [and] the
arbitrators' conception of the legal meaning of such statutory requirements ... cannot be
examined." Id. at 436. Additionally, the Court noted that its "[p]ower to vacate an award
is limited" and that the congressional policy "afforded participants... an opportunity
generally to secure prompt, economical and adequate solution of controversies through
arbitration" could not be subordinated to the congressional intent to "protect the rights of
investors" by permitting a waiver of rights guaranteed by the Securities Act of 1933. Id.
at 436, 438. But see Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477,
480-481 (1989) (overruling Wilko to the extent that Wilko relied upon suspicion 6f
arbitration and held that the right to select a judicial forum was a nonwaivable right).
42 See Wilko, 346 U.S. at 431-432 (denying arbitrability of statutory claims, but
noting that commercial arbitration of nonstatutory claims was an efficient mechanism which
courts should otherwise honor).
43 Although the FAA does not figure prominently in labor arbitration involving
collective bargaining agreements, see infra note 101 and accompanying text, the treatment
here is to demonstrate that the Court simultaneously promoted and developed both
commercial and labor arbitration law using similar principles.
44 See United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960)
(holding that an arbitrator was not required to produce a written award and that a court
could not alter an arbitral finding based on mere disagreement with the award); United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960) (holding that doubts
should be resolved in favor of arbitrability); United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co.,
363 U.S. 564 (1960) (holding that a broad collective bargaining agreement to arbitrate
required the submission of all disputes to arbitration and not just those a court would find
meritorious).
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unions and employers. Although the Court acknowledged that labor and
commercial arbitration purposes were differentiated, 45 the practice and
deference to be shown by the court system are analogous. The Court
continued to embrace its approval of arbitration several years later when the
Court held that procedural arbitrability would be left to the arbitrator once the
substantive issues were found to lie within the scope of the arbitration
contract. 46
Following a continued path of a liberal policy toward arbitration, the
Court continued to expand and clarify its position. In Prima Paint Corp. v.
Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co. ,47 the Court held that, in the absence of
any evidence to the contrary, an arbitrator could decide the issue of fraud in
the inducement of the entire contract containing the arbitration clause.48
Because all arbitral authority is derived from the contract, this decision gave
arbitrators permission to decide whether an enforceable contract existed in
light of the allegations of fraud. One year later, the Court delineated the
degree of bias required to set aside an arbitral award. 49
During 1974, the Court decided Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co. 50 and began
to lift the few restraints placed on arbitral subject matter. Although the Wilko
Court had found that certain statutory rights could not be waived for resolution
45 "In the commercial case, arbitration is a substitute for litigation. Here [labor]
arbitration is the substitute for industrial strife. Since arbitration of labor disputes has quite
different functions from arbitration under an ordinary commercial agreement, the hostility
evinced by courts toward arbitration of commercial agreements has no place here."
Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 578. Additionally, the Warrior & Gulf Court noted:
Courts and arbitration in the context of most commercial contracts are resorted to
because there has been a breakdown in the working relationship of the parties; such
resort is the unwanted exception. But the grievance machinery under a collective
bargaining agreement is at the very heart of the system of industrial self-government.
Arbitration is the means of solving the unforeseeable by molding a system of private
law for all problems which may arise and to provide for their solution in a way which
will generally accord with the variant needs and desires of the parties.
Id. at 581.
46 See John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 557 (1964); see also
supra notes 17-21 and accompanying text.
47 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
48 See id. at 406.
49 See Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 147-
148 (1968) (holding that evidence demonstrating that the arbitrator and one of the parties
maintained a financial relationship raised a sufficient inference of bins to vacate the award).
50 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
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in an arbitral forum, 51 the Scherk Court permitted the parties to arbitrate
claims under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Securities Exchange Act)52
because the "considerations and policies" were different from those in
Wilko. 53 The Court understood the agreement as a forum selection clause that
established the place and procedures of resolution without detracting from
recourse to substantive relief.54 A similar analysis was applied subsequently
in Southland Corp. v. Keating55 in which the Court held that the FAA
preempts a state law that attempted specifically to deny enforcement of
arbitration clauses in franchise agreements and that state statutory law could
not prohibit enforcement of an arbitration agreement. Southland Corp. was
decided during the same period in which the Court reaffirmed the liberal
national policy toward arbitration and the presumption in favor of arbitrability
in commercial disputes. 56
During the 1980s the Court continued the Scherk line of reasoning and
enforced agreements to arbitrate numerous other statutory claims. 57
Identifying the international business context and a presumption in favor of
arbitrability, the Court in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc.58 concluded that arbitration of Sherman Act59 antitrust claims
was permissible. 60 The Court held that a determination of arbitrability of
51 See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
52 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm (1994 & Supp. II 1996).
53 Scherk, 417 U.S. at 515. The "crucial difference" between the two cases was that
Scherk involved a "truly international agreement" between a domestic and foreign party.
Id. Due to the uncertainty engendered by international contracts, the Court found that an
arbitration agreement covering broad subject matter was an "indispensable precondition to
the achievement of the orderliness and predictability essential to any international business
transaction" and prevented resolution of claims in hostile forums. Id. at 516.
54 See id. at 519.
55 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984) (holding that the FAA preempted California law prohibiting
arbitration of certain franchise investment law claims); see also Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S.
483, 490-491 (1987) (holding that under the Supremacy Clause, the FAA preempted state
labor laws specifically prohibiting enforcement of arbitration agreements concerning wage
collection actions). But see Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees, 489 U.S. 468,
476 (1989) (holding that the preemptive power of the FAA is limited to state laws that deny
enforcement to arbitration provisions generally).
56 See Moses H. Cone Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1982).
57 The Court's treatment of statutory antidiscrimination claims in employment and
arbitration is discussed infra Part III.
58 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
59 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994).
60 " [W]e find no warrant in the Arbitration Act for implying in every contract within
its ken a presumption against arbitration of statutory claims." Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S.
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statutory claims required a finding that an enforceable arbitration agreement
existed, that the parties had agreed to arbitrate that particular type of dispute,
and that Congress had not displayed any intent to foreclose a waiver of the
judicial forum. 61 The Mitsubishi Motors Court also entrenched the merely
"procedural" character of arbitration in relation to judicial fora.62 The Court
continued its trek to permit arbitration of statutory claims in
Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon63 and Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc. 64 These decisions, relying on the Scherk and
Mitsubishi Motors decisions, hold that, so long as arbitration provides an
adequate means of enforcing the statutory scheme and there is no
congressional intent to prevent arbitration, the judicial system should honor
the parties' agreement and enforce predispute arbitration agreements. 65
As litigation costs rose dramatically and the court system adopted greater
deference to arbitral authority, businesses found it advantageous to include
arbitration clauses in their contracts to avoid costly suits.66 Thus, sophisticated
commercial entities, dealing in an arm's-length transaction, could effectively
resolve to settle their future disputes without court intervention, in the
expectation of privacy, speed, and cost containment. Parties now relied upon
the courts to enforce and interpret liberally their arbitration agreements and
also to insulate arbitral awards from intensive judicial review.
Today, the commercial purposes and goals of arbitration remain intact.
Parties continue to realize the benefits of privacy, speed, and cost
containment. In addition to the advantages of informal procedural and
at 625.
61 See id. at 626-628. The first prong is established by reference to the requirements
of the FAA and state contract law, the second by the intention of the parties, and the third
by whether anything in the text or legislative history of a congressional act demonstrates
an intent to preclude arbitrability. See id. Additionally, the last prong may be proven by
an inherent conflict between the purposes of the statute and the goals of arbitration. See id.
at 628; see also infra notes 178-179 and accompanying text.
62 "By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive
rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than
a judicial, forum." Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 628.
63 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (enforcing arbitration of Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims).
64 490 U.S. 477 (1989) (enforcing arbitration of Securities Act of 1933 claims and
overruling Wilko).
65 See id. at 482-483; see also McMahon, 482 U.S. at 230-232, 239-242.
66 See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 431 (1953) (stating that the FAA establishes an
alternative to litigation and meets a "need for avoiding the delay and expense of
litigation").
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evidentiary requirements, the parties may arrange for selection of the arbitral
panelists (often employing experts in the industry), agree upon the scope of
arbitral authority, and include limitations on awards. 67 Further, the arbitrators
often do not, and may be encouraged not to, produce a written decision. 68 The
overriding goal is to permit parties to escape litigation by entering into an
arm's-length contractual agreement to settle disputes through arbitration, as
that process is structured to their preferences. As such, federal arbitration law
has developed to promote this goal by erecting presumptions in favor of
arbitrability and by limiting judicial review to protect the needs of commercial
parties who prefer a private forum to resolve disputes and, therefore, waive
access to the judicial systems.
III. FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT ANTIDISCRIMINATION STATUTES
AND ARBITRATION
The legal system's endorsement of binding predispute arbitration
originally embraced contractual transactions in a commercial environment.
Indeed, passage of the FAA focused on the purely commercial interests in
arbitration. 69 An important question arose, however, when parties sought
arbitration of statutory rights in addition to arbitration of contractual
obligations. 70 Although the Supreme Court continued to affirm the federal
policy favoring arbitration, early on it imposed procedural limitations on
statutory right vindication in some circumstances, 71 and, until recently, the
67 See id. at 436-437.
68 See id. at 436.
69 See supra notes 11-16 and accompanying text.
70 See supra notes 40-65 and accompanying text (discussing the line of Supreme Court
cases permitting arbitration of statutory claims under the Securities Act of 1933, the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Sherman Act, and RICO).
71 The courts first addressed arbitration of employment discrimination claims in the
context of collective bargaining agreements. The Supreme Court had adopted an early
favorable attitude toward arbitration in the organized labor context through the Steelworkers
Trilogy. See generally United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S.
593 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960);
United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960). The Court found that
this policy required a grievant under a collective bargaining agreement to exhaust the
grievance procedure before seeking judicial remedy for discrimination claims, but that,
upon exhaustion, the grievant could not be barred from instituting judicial action regardless
of the grievance procedure's treatment of the claim. See Emporium Capwell Co. v.
Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50, 69-70 (1975) (finding that former
employees' racial discrimination claims under Title VII were within the collective
bargaining grievance procedures so that employees should first exhaust the available
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Court did not regularly begin to enforce binding arbitration of public law
claims. 72 This Part provides background on that portion of public law
prohibiting discrimination in employment and the legal system's
encouragement and enforcement of binding arbitration clauses that encompass
claims made under these public laws.
A. Federal Employment Antidiscrimination Statutes73
The United States Congress has determined that a number of rights and
obligations owed between parties should not be determined solely by
agreement between them. Rather, the public interest requires some degree of
involvement of the government. The legislature has created and protected
procedures before seeking independent remedy). But see Alexander v. Gardner-Denver
Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974) (finding that racial discrimination claims that were exhausted
under collective bargaining arrangements and that provided an arbitral award in favor of
the employer would not bar subsequent judicial action on allegations arising from the same
set of facts). The Court noted that the special function of labor arbitration for the peaceful
resolution of industrial disputes required parties to observe collective bargaining rules. See
Emporium Capwell, 420 U.S. at 69-70 (denoting the importance of collective bargaining
arbitration agreements and delineating employee substantive rights from procedural
requirements under the National Labor Relations Act).
72 See discussion supra notes 40-65 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's
evolution from its decision in Wilko to the present); see also infra Part III.B (examining
pre- and post-Gilmer treatment of arbitration agreements concerning employment
antidiscrimination statutes).
73 While this article primarily addresses federal antidiscrimination statutes, states also
have enacted employment antidiscrimination laws. See, e.g., District of Columbia Human
Rights Act, D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-2501 to 1-2557 (1992 & Supp. 1998); Minnesota
Human Rights Act, MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 363.01-363.15 (West 1991 & Supp. 1998);
Missouri Human Rights Act, Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 213.010-213.137 (West 1996 & Supp.
1998); New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-1 to 10:542
(West 1993 & Supp. 1997); New York Human Rights Law, N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 296
(McKinney 1993 & Supp. 1998). However, state antidiscrimination laws parallel federal
antidiscrimination laws and are interpreted similarly to avoid any conflict of purpose. See
Hull v. NCR Corp., 826 F. Supp. 303, 306 (E.D. Mo. 1993) (foregoing analysis of state
antidiscrimination statute arbitrability after finding the statute parallel to Title VII).
Additionally, state antidiscrimination laws that prohibit a waiver of judicial access
through arbitration are pre-empted by the FAA, such that their application is analogous to
similar federal antidiscrimination statutes. See Great W. Mortgage Corp. v. Peacock, 110
F.3d 222, 230-231 (3d Cir. 1997); Johnson v. Hubbard Broad., Inc., 940 F. Supp. 1447,
1452-1453 (D. Minn. 1996); Benefits Communication Corp. v. Klieforth, 642 A.2d 1299,
1301-1302 (D.C. 1994) (using Title VII as a guide in interpretation of the District's
antidiscrimination statute); Johnson v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 530 N.W.2d 790, 799 (Minn.
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these rights through the enactment of public laws, 74 which by their nature
cannot be abrogated by members of the general public, but are rights that
inhere through the relationship between government and citizens. The laws
protect rights of special interest or concern to the public. Public laws occur in
a variety of forms, and they serve to effectuate the goal of preserving an
overriding public concern for the retention of "basic" rights.75
An important subcategory of public laws is found in the federal
employment antidiscrimination statutes. Congress has established a basic
group of impermissible discriminatory conduct standards that employers
generally must avoid in their hiring and discharging decisions. While
employers often are free to conduct their business as they see fit,76
1995) ("[P]laintiff's reliance on a state statutory anti-discrimination scheme.., rather than
on a federal statutory anti-discrimination scheme, does not alter the analysis of
enforceability of arbitration agreements under the FAA."); Fletcher v. Kidder, Peabody
& Co., 619 N.E.2d 998, 1002 (N.Y. 1993) ("Where the [antidiscrimination] right is
predicated on a State or local statute rather than on a congressional enactment, it is
undisputed... that the courts are obliged to draw an analogy to the equivalent Federal
law .... ").
74 A public law is defined as:
A general classification of law, consisting generally of constitutional, administrative,
criminal, and international law, concerned with the organization of the state, the
relations between the state and the people who compose it, the responsibilities of
public officers to the state, to each other, and to private persons, and the relations of
the states to one another. An act which relates to the public as a whole. It may be (1)
general (applying to all persons within the jurisdiction), (2) local (applying to a
geographical area), or (3) special (relating to an organization which is charged with
a public interest).
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1230 (6th ed. 1990). Employment antidiscrimination statutes
qualify for the third category as a special public law applying to business organizations
charged with protection of the public interest against unwarranted discriminatory practices
in hiring and employment.
75 See, e.g., Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994 & Supp. 111996) (protecting free
competition through antitrust provisions); Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-
77bbbb (1994 & Supp. I 1996) (requiring mandatory disclosures for the protection of
public capital markets); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm (1994
& Supp. II 1996) (establishing rules for exchange registration to protect the public from
fraud and misleading information in capital markets); Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C.
§§ 101-1008 (1994 & Supp. 111996) (protecting rights in creative expressions to promote
disclosure and provide a uniform system of law); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-
1387 (1994 & Supp. 11995) (preserving water quality for the benefit of the public); Patent
Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1994 & Supp. 11995) (protecting rights in novel inventions to
promote disclosure and invention).
76 The employment-at-will doctrine allows an employer to discharge an at-will
employee for good cause or no cause at all. This reflects a nonintrusive policy by the
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discriminatory policies violate an elementary public interest to be free from
unwarranted prejudice and harassment on the basis of age, gender, race,
ethnicity, or disability- characteristics which often bear no relation to the
operations of the employer or the employee's ability to perform. 77 Because a
strong public concern seeks to prevent unfair and unjust employment practices
grounded in improper biases, Congress has enacted several statutes to prevent
these practices and protect employees from unjustified discrimination in the
workplace.
The most commonly invoked of these statutes are Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (Civil Rights Act or Title VII), 78 the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act (ADEA),79 and the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA). 80 These enactments are designed to eliminate employment
discrimination practices through which employers deny individuals fair and
equal protection on the basis of their age, gender, race, ethnicity, or disability.
The Civil Rights Act was "intended to implement and give further force to
government to permit market forces to act independently and to allow management free
reign over its operations. Recently, however, the at-will doctrine has come under
increasing attack and restriction through the imposition of public policy and implied
contract principles, such that the power of the employer to discharge workers under the at-
will doctrine has been limited. See generally Hayford & Evers, supra note 7.
77 See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (stating that justification
for gender based discrimination cannot rely on "overbroad generalizations" about specific
gender qualities, but must have more objective purposes); see also Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 236 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that "racial
characteristics so seldom provide a relevant basis for disparate treatment, and.., are
potentially so harmful to the entire body politic") (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S.
448, 533-534 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
78 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-2000h-6 (1994) (prohibiting race and gender discrimination).
79 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994) (prohibiting age discrimination).
80 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994 & Supp. 111996) and 47 U.S.C. § 225 (1994)
(prohibiting discrimination based on certain disabilities). In addition to Title VII; the
ADEA, and the ADA, numerous other statutory employment rights appear throughout the
United States Code. See, e.g., Title III of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1674 (1994) (limiting employer ability to discharge on the basis of garnished wages); Fair
Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994 & Supp. 1 1995); Older Workers
Benefit Protection Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994 & Supp. 11995); Occupational Safety
and Health Act (OSHA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1994 & Supp. 1 1995); Employee
Polygraph Protection Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2001-2009 (1994 & Supp. 1 1995); Worker
Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2109 (1994); Family and
Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (1994 & Supp. 11995). Because many of the
current disputes concerning the arbitrability of public laws against discrimination appear
in the context of Title VII, ADA, and ADEA claims, this Article focuses on these statutes
and addresses other public laws only when appropriate.
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basic personal rights guaranteed by the Constitution" by prohibiting
"discrimination based on race, color, age, or religion." 81 The ADEA was
enacted to "promote employment of older persons based on their ability rather
than age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment; [and] to help
employers and workers find ways of meeting problems arising from the impact
of age on employment." 82 The ADA was enacted on similar grounds for the
protection of the disabled. 83 The overall congressional purpose in enacting
these statutes is straightforward- to generally protect members of the public
from discriminatory employment practices when the basis for discrimination
concerns traits unrelated to the employee's abilities in relation to job
performance.
While the overriding purpose of the antidiscrimination laws is very clear,
the mechanisms for their enforcement are not. The government has left
enforcement of employment discrimination claims to the parties who allege
discrimination and to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, an
agency designed to investigate, process, and sometimes pursue illegal
discriminatory practices. 84 An aggrieved employee seeking a statutory remedy
may file an action in federal court against the employer, although the cost
often is prohibitive. 85 Alternatively, some statutes, including Title VII, the
ADEA, and the ADA, require the employee to file a timely charge with the
EEOC for agency evaluation. 86 Following evaluation, the EEOC will notify
the employee whether the claim has no merit, grant the employee a Letter to
81 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 246 (6th ed. 1990). For instance, a main goal of the
Civil Rights Act was "to override the corrupting influence of the Ku Klux Klan and its
sympathizers on the governments and law enforcement agencies of the Southern States,"
especially because "the state courts had been deficient in protecting federal rights" against
discrimination. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 98-99 (1980).
82 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 27 (1991) (quoting 29
U.S.C. § 621(b) (1988)) (alteration in original).
83 See 42 U.S.C. § 12101.
84 For a discussion of the EEOC's role in enforcement and investigation of statutory
rights, see Nicholson v. CPC Int'l Inc., 877 F.2d 221, 236-240 (3d Cir. 1989) (Becker,
J., dissenting), overruled by Gilmer, 500 U.S. 20.
85 See Maltby, supra note 8, at 2 (noting that the current monetary range of litigating
an employment dispute is at least $5000 to $10,000, or an average of $7500, while the
average annual wage for employees is only about $23,000).
86 See 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (1994) (the ADEA); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1994) (Title
VII); 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (1994) (the ADA); see also Christine Godsil Cooper, Where
Are We Going with Gimer?-Some Ruminations on the Arbitration of Discrimination
Claims, 11 ST. Louis U. PuB. L. REv. 203, 205 (1992). A timely dispute is measured
from the date of the alleged discrimination. See id.
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Sue, or seek enforcement itself.8 7 The EEOC usually does not sue88 and
merely advises the employee on his likelihood of success in court. Thus, the
employee usually is left to vindicate his civil rights independent of any
significant agency or government assistance during litigation.
In addition to providing enforcement through litigation, Title VII and the
ADA contain express provisions encouraging settlement through the use of
alternative dispute resolution. 89 Section 118 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991
states that "[w]here appropriate and to the extent authorized by law, the use
of alternative means of dispute resolution, including ... arbitration, is
encouraged to resolve disputes" under the Act.90 A similar provision appears
87 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b); 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a); Cooper, supra note 86, at 205
n.13, 238. So long as the EEOC does not decide to sue in its capacity as an agency before
the employee files suit, no action taken by the EEOC prevents the employee from seeking
an audience before the court. See Cooper, supra note 86, at 205 n.13, 238. Thus, the
EEOC's role is to provide a centralized organization in order to provide advisory,
investigatory, and review resources and, only in exceptional cases, direct enforcement
against violators of antidiscrimination laws. See id. at 209. Unless the EEOC has instituted
its own action, the employee is free at any time to file suit in state or federal court. See id.
at 205.
88 Of the ADEA cases fied with the EEOC, fewer than 0.25% of them are accepted
for litigation by the EEOC. See Cooper, supra note 86, at 205 n.13, 238. Because the role
of the EEOC centers primarily upon review of allegations of discriminatory practices, the
agency's purpose appears to focus on keeping track of employment practices and
enforcement of continuing violations rather than acting directly to litigate a substantial
number of claims. This role is in accord with the public laws' purpose to expose and deter
such practices.
89 There is no direct indication whether the statutes encourage only arbitration
agreements concerning existing disputes or even whether predispute arbitration agreements
are permitted. See Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875, 881
(4th Cir. 1996) (noting that the legislative history for several public law statutes addressing
discrimination promotes the "use of alternative means of dispute resolution, where
appropriate and to the extent authorized by law") (quoting H.R. CONF. REP. No. 101-755
(1990)).
90 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994). The conference report accompanying this piece of
legislation states that "any agreement to submit disputed issues to arbitration, whether in
the context of a collective bargaining agreement or in an employment contract, does not
preclude the affected person from seeking relief under the enforcement provisions." H.R.
REP. No. 101-856 (1990), reprinted in 136 CONG. Ruc. H9552-01, H9559 (1990); see also
137 CONG. REc. H9505-01, H9530 (1991) (providing an analysis of section 118). Although
the amendment was made after the Gilmer decision, debate exists concerning whether the
amendment changed Gilmer's applicability to Title VII. See Benefits Communication Corp.
v. Klieforth, 642 A.2d 1299, 1304-1305 (D.C. 1994) (holding that the amendment and
legislative history did not alter Gilmer's application to Title VII claim arbitration). But see
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in the ADA.91 The ADEA does not contain such a provision. While the intent
of Congress for inserting these sections is unclear, 92 the policy behind these
"pro-alternative dispute resolution" clauses is to provide additional venues for
broad substantive relief of discriminatory practices and to address
impermissible discrimination in employment. The Supreme Court opines that
alternative dispute resolutions are not to "supplant" any substantive rights
under the statutes, but rather to provide an alternative forum for resolution of
employment disputes concerning prohibited discriminatory practices. 93
Nevertheless, the issue of arbitrability of statutory employment
antidiscrimination claims has arisen due to the recent court decisions. A full-
scale war exists over the propriety of resolving employment rights in
commercial arbitration. As the proponents and opponents of this alternative
to litigation have girded for battle, the issues, if not the answers themselves,
are clearly articulated.
B. Evolution of Arbitration as Applied to Statutory Employment Claims
Initially, the Supreme Court held that the Federal Arbitration Act could
not be used to enforce arbitration of statutory or public law claims. 94
Arbitration was reserved for the commercial arena in which contract rights
and remedies, not statutory law rights and remedies, were the basis of the
dispute. Simultaneously, however, the Court also expressed a firm preference
Prudential Ins. Co. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299, 1304 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding that the 1991
amendment committee comments, which state that ADR mechanisms were "intended to
supplement, not supplant" Title VII remedies, signified an intent to allow parties to pursue
court remedies in contrast to Gilmer's arbitrability standard).
91 See 42 U.S.C. § 12212 (1994).
92 The uncertainty arises over whether Congress intended to provide an " either/or"
choice for prospective litigants or a "both/and" alternative. See supra note 71 and
accompanying text (discussing labor arbitration in the union sector). Under the former, an
employee would be bound to arbitrate or litigate a claim. See supra note 71 and
accompanying text. The latter, however, would permit a party independently to pursue
allegations in arbitration without foreclosing any right to bring the claims in court. See
supra note 71 and accompanying text.
93 See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28 (1991) ("[S]o long
as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate [his or her] statutory cause of action
in the arbitral forum, the statute will continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent
functions.") (alterations in original) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 (1985)); see also discussion supra notes 62-65 and
accompanying text.
94 See supra notes 40-65 and accompanying text (discussing shifts in judicial attitudes
toward public law arbitration).
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for the mechanism of labor arbitration as a means to resolve industrial
disputes. 95 Here, too, the Court recognized the power of a negotiated
contract- the collective bargaining agreement- and left the dispute resolution
process to the parties' mutual agreement.
Historically, organized labor has provided a democratic voice for workers
who could not effectively exert their voices individually. The National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA)96 recognized the "inequality of bargaining power
between employees ... and employers who are organized in the corporate"
body and promoted the collective bargaining process as a means for
employees to unite and bargain with employers over working conditions. 97
Unions, supported by a majority of the employees in a bargaining unit and
operating under democratic auspices, 98 serve as representatives during the
collective bargaining negotiations and develop a working contract
encompassing the majoritarian concerns of its members. Because the collective
arrangement encompasses "the whole employment relationship" and
represents a "system of industrial self-governance," 99 Congress endorsed
inclusion of grievance arbitration as a means for those within the industrial
environment to resolve the disputes that arose. 100 Due to the paramount
importance of collective bargaining provisions for arbitration and the
maintenance of a working employer-employee relationship, the Court required
compliance with arbitration agreements and specifically enforced them under
section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act (LMRA). 101 Thus, the
95 See generally United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593
(1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960);
United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
96 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1994).
97 Id. § 151; see also id. §§ 158-159 (discussing rights of employees and unfair labor
practices).
98 Unions are selected based on a finding of majority support from the appropriate
bargaining unit. See id. § 160. As such, the union does not represent the interests of a
particular individual worker, but rather the majority interests of the workers in the unit.
Additionally, the 1959 Landrum-Griffin Act added amendments to the NLRA that required
democratic reform in union governance and increased participation of union members,
again under the notion of "majority rule." See id.; see also Labor-Management Reporting
and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1994).
99 Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 578, 580.
100 "Arbitration is the means of solving the unforeseeable by molding a system of
private law for all the problems which may arise and to provide for their solution in a way
which will generally accord with the variant needs and desires of the parties." Id. at 581.
101 See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 451 (1957) (using
section 301 of the LMRA as a means to require specific performance of a collective
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government accepted labor arbitration conducted under authority of a
collective bargaining arrangement as a means to resolve employer-employee
disputes in organized labor. 102
bargaining agreement and compel arbitration); see also Labor-Management Relations Act,
29 U.S.C. § 185 (1994) (codifying section 301 of the LMRA and embodying both federal
procedural and substantive law for enforcement of collective bargaining agreements).
An important side note is the unresolved applicability of the FAA in regard to
enforcement of collective bargaining agreement arbitration provisions. Several decisions
have held that the FAA may not apply to enforcement of collective bargaining agreements.
See Goodal-Sanford, Inc. v. United Textile Workers, 353 U.S. 550, 551 (1957) (finding
that section 301 of the LMRA applied to collective bargaining agreement actions and failing
to reach the issue of whether a similar decision based on the FAA was appealable); see also
General Elec. Co. v. Local 205, United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers, 353 U.S. 547,
548 (1957) (passing upon the lower court's reliance on the FAA to enforce collective
bargaining arbitration and instead using section 301); Miller Brewing Co. v. Brewery
Workers Local Union No. 9, 739 F.2d 1159, 1162 (7th Cir. 1984) (finding that the
collective bargaining agreement was within the FAA's purview, but that section 301 of the
LMRA "was enacted long after the [Federal] Arbitration Act and ... therefore
supersedes ... the standards of the earlier act"). Other decisions explicitly have used the
FAA to enforce labor arbitration. See International Union of Operating Eng'rs v. Murphy
Co., 82 F.3d 185, 188-189 (7th Cir. 1996) ("[The] FAA and LMRA establish [the] same
governing principles and '[c]ourts routinely cite decisions under one statute as authority for
decisions under the other.'") (quoting National Wrecking Co. v. International Bhd. of
Teamsters, Local No. 731, 790 F. Supp. 785, 789 (N.D. II1. 1992)); see also Pietro
Scalzitti Co. v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs, 351 F.2d 576, 579-580 (7th Cir.
1965) (holding that the "contracts of employment" language in section 1 of the FAA did
not exempt collective bargaining agreements from coverage). Still others have denied
application of the FAA, although the facts dictate that the parties may have met section 1
of the FAA's exemption for those employees actively engaged in interstate commerce. See
Domino Sugar Corp. v. Sugar Workers Local Union 392, 10 F.3d 1064, 1067-1068 (4th
Cir. 1993) (finding "the FAA does not apply to disputes stemming from collective
bargaining agreements," but questioning whether the congressional policy in the FAA
should extend to such agreements); Herring v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 894 F.2d 1020, 1023
(9th Cir. 1990) (finding that the FAA did not apply to enforce arbitration of the pilots'
union agreement); United Food & Commercial Workers v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 889 F.2d
940, 943-944 (10th Cir. 1989) ("The Arbitration Act... is generally inapplicable to labor
arbitration.") (citing United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29 (1987)).
An interesting point, relating to the exclusion of "contracts of employment of seamen"
in section 1 of the FAA, is a decision holding that, unlike other union collective bargaining
agreements, enforcement of maritime labor arbitration under section 301 of the LRMA is
optional rather than required. See U.S. Bulk Carriers, Inc. v. Arguelles, 400 U.S. 351, 357
(1971) (holding that section 301 of the LMRA did not abrogate the statutory remedy of
seaman to sue for wages in federal court and was instead an optional remedy under the
applicable collective bargaining agreement).
102 Before the 1980s arbitration of employment disputes outside of the collective
bargaining field was absent from the case law. This phenomenon likely was due to the lack
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This reception, however, did not extend to all employment related
disputes occurring in the context of organized labor. Reminiscent of the Wilko
decision, several Supreme Court decisions held that statutory rights could not
be subordinated to the confines of arbitration. In 1974 the Court held in
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. 103 that it would not enforce arbitration of
an employee's Title VII claims, despite the existence of a collective bargaining
agreement. 104 Alexander, a maintenance employee represented by the United
Steelworkers of America, filed a grievance under the collective bargaining
agreement upon being discharged. 105 Before Alexander's claim was referred
to arbitration, he filed a charge of racial discrimination with the EEOC
"because [Alexander felt] he 'could not rely on the union."' 106 The arbitrator
ruled against the discharged employee, without addressing any racial
discrimination claims. The EEOC found no basis for a Title VII action,107 but
Alexander nonetheless brought a Title VII action against the employer. The
U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado dismissed the action as one
that had been resolved through the arbitral process- that Alexander had
voluntarily elected to pursue in lieu of a judicial hearing.' 08 The court of
appeals affirmed the lower court's analysis. 109
In an unanimous decision, the Supreme Court reversed the lower courts
and held that Alexander could pursue his Title VII claims before the
judiciary." 0 Although the Court noted that election of remedies and the liberal
federal attitude towards labor arbitration spoke directly to the relationship
of contractual arrangements with at-will employees. While the rise of individual
employment contracts in the context of the narrowing at-will doctrine is beyond the scope
of this Article, some commentary exists on the subject. See generally Hayford & Evers,
supra note 7.
103 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
104 But see Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S.
50, 71-73 (1975) (holding that individual employee protests against Civil Rights Act
violations did not protect the employees from termination under the National Labor
Relations Act where the employees failed to exhaust collective bargaining procedures for
grievance arbitration).
105 See Alexander, 415 U.S. at 38-39. The company alleged that Alexander's
discharge was based on poor performance and that, although Alexander's grievance claimed
that such termination was unjust, he did not raise the issue of racial discrimination during
the grievance procedure. See id.
106 Id. at 42.
107 See id. at 42-43.
108 See id. at 43.
109 See id.
110 See id. at 59-60.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
between courts and collective bargaining arrangements, the Court also noted
that Title VII rights had nothing to do with protection against industrial
strife."1 The Court found nothing in the statutory scheme to prevent
Alexander from pursuing remedies both in arbitration and the courts. 112 The
Court delineated an employee's "contractual rights" under collective
bargaining agreements from the "statutory rights" provided by Title VII.113
Because the labor arbitrator's power did not extend beyond the negotiated
contract, he could decide only the employee's rights under the collective
bargaining agreement, and not the statutory claims.11 4 Furthermore, the Court
found that the federal policy favoring private arbitration was difficult to
reconcile with the congressional mandate giving federal courts the
responsibility to enforce statutory discrimination claims.115 Still further, the
opinion noted the inadequacy of arbitral procedures to resolve Title VII
rights. 116 Foremost, the Court highlighted (1) arbitrators' general lack of
competence to decide statutory matters, (2) the incompleteness of arbitral fact-
finding and procedures, and (3) the lack of written awards. 117 Finally, the
Court held that the policies of Title VII and other antidiscrimination laws "can
best be accommodated by permitting an employee to pursue fully both his
111 See id. at 47 (noting that Title VII did invest "plenary powers" in the judiciary to
enforce its dictates and that it established prerequisites for doing so).
112 See id. (" [S]ubmission of a claim to one forum does not preclude a later
submission to another."). The Court also noted that the legislative history recognized an
intent to permit employees to seek redress under both grievance arbitration and judicial
action. See id. at 48-49.
113 Id. at 49-50 ("The distinctly separate nature of these contractual and statutory
rights is not vitiated merely because both were violated as a result of the same factual
occurrence. And certainly no inconsistency results from permitting both rights to be
enforced in their respectively appropriate forums.").
114 See id. at 53-54 (stating that a collective bargaining arbitrator "has no general
authority to invoke public laws").
115 The Court differentiated collective rights that unions bargain-and waive- in the
interest of the majority of their members from an individual's rights under Title VII, which
a union has no power to bargain under "majoritarian processes." Id. at 51. Because a union
may not prospectively waive individual member rights under Title VII, a negotiated
grievance arbitration provision does not act as a waiver to judicial resolution of Title VII
claims. See id.
116 See id. at 56.
117 See id. at 57-58. The Court noted that efficiency arguments in favor of arbitral
resolution were based on streamlined judicial procedures peculiarly inadequate to address
complex statutory claims or to justify the possible detriment to victims of discrimination.
See id. at 59.
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remedy under the grievance-arbitration clause of a collective bargaining
agreement and his cause of action under Title VII." 118
The Court continued its Alexander line of -reasoning in two analogous
cases. 119 In Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 120 the Court
denied arbitration, under a collective bargaining agreement, of claims arising
under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).121 The Court recognized
majoritarian concerns of permitting an individual's statutory rights to be
circumscribed by a majority-rule union contract. 122 Additionally, the Court
doubted that the arbitral forum could adequately protect the employee's
rights. 123 The dissent differentiated Alexander and would have invoked the
118 Id. at 59-60. Federal courts should consider claims de novo and may admit the
arbitral decision into evidence. See id. at 60. While foreclosing neither forum to
discrimination claims, the Court retained a mechanism that would assist in resolution of
duplicative contractual and statutory claims arising from the same set of facts. See id.
119 The Court's holding in Empbrium Capwell may seem apposite to Alexander on
first reading. The Emporium Capwell Court held that employees who had engaged in
concerted activity to protest alleged racial discrimination could be terminated under the
NLRA, regardless of claims under Title VII, for their failure to utilize existing grievance
procedures. See Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S.
50, 73 (1975). The opinion noted that the need to protect the majoritarian influence of
exclusive bargaining representatives superseded an employee's right to subvert the
representative's exclusive status and instead seek redress in the interest of the individual
rather than the bargaining unit. See id. at 62-65. As such, the substantive right to be free
from discrimination must coincide with procedural rights under the NLRA. See id. at 69
(noting that "elimination of discrimination and its vestiges is an appropriate subject of
bargaining"). Thus, alleged discriminatory dismissal may violate Title VII while
comporting with the NLRA where the employee fails to process his grievance in
accordance with the negotiated collective bargaining agreement. Note, however, that this
holding does nothing to the primary holding of Alexander, which provides that an employee
is permitted to pursue discrimination claims in court and through properly executed
grievance procedures.
120 450 U.S. 728 (1981).
121 See id. at 737 (citing Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974) in
support of its holding); see also 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 201-219 (West 1998).
122 See id. at 734 (stating that "tension arises... when the parties to a collective
bargaining agreement make an employee's entitlement to substantive statutory rights subject
to [majoritarian-decided] contractual dispute-resolution procedures"). The Court noted that
while collective bargaining rights inhered to the members of the unit as a whole, protection
under the FLSA extended specifically to individuals. See id. at 739-740 (finding that no
exhaustion of grievance procedures or waiver could bar FLSA claims by represented
employees).
123 See id. at 742-745. Deciding that a union could not be expected to defend
vigorously individuals' claims that may clash with the position of the unit as a whole, the
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
federal endorsement for labor arbitration as the mechanism to resolve
industrial strife. 124
The second case, McDonald v. City of West Branch,125 held that a labor
arbitration decision concerning a claim under section 1983 of the Civil Rights
Act could not be granted the beneficial effect of either res judicata or
collateral estoppel in a subsequent court action. 126 After a discharged police
officer lost in arbitration under the collective bargaining agreement, 127 the
employee brought a suit under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act against the
City of West Branch. After holding that arbitration awards were not subject
to full faith and credit, 128 the Court relied on Alexander and Barrentine to find
that Congress intended federal statutes such as section 1983 to be enforced in
and by federal courts. 129 Analogously, the Court also repeated arbitral
inadequacies such as an arbitrator's inexperience with statutory claims, the
hearing's limited proceedings, related evidentiary rules, and the majoritarian
concerns. 130 Thus, an arbitral decision, rendered pursuant to a collective
bargaining agreement, on a section 1983 claim was not a "judicial
proceeding" providing the effect of res judicata or collateral estoppel.
The Court continued this line of reasoning throughout the 1980s, although
it became increasingly liberal toward enforcing arbitration of other statutory
claims. While the Court was beginning to reassess the Wilko bar on the
arbitration of statutory claims arising within commercial contexts, 131 the
judicial system demonstrated no sign of denying access to the courts for the
redress of statutorily prohibited employment discrimination. 132 Following the
Court also believed that arbitral competence, procedures, and lack of power beyond the
collective bargaining agreement would not vindicate statutory claims. See id.
124 See id. at 746-753 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (distinguishing the FLSA from Title
VII while arguing for the arbitrability of claims under the former statute).
125 466 U.S. 284 (1984) (unanimous opinion).
126 See id. at 292.
127 The officer alleged that his discharge was based on his exercise of First
Amendment rights. See id. at 286.
128 "Arbitration is not a 'judicial proceeding' and, therefore, § 1738 [of the Federal
Full Faith and Credit Statute] does not apply to arbitration awards." Id. at 288 (footnote
omitted).
129 See id. at 289-290.
130 See id. at 290-291.
131 See supra notes 47-65 and accompanying text.
132 Interestingly, the first cases to compel arbitration of statutory claims arising out
of commercial transactions involved international business transactions. See Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985) (stating that the
"concerns of international comity, respect for the capacities of foreign and transnational
tribunals, and sensitivity to the need of the international commercial system for
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Alexander line of cases, courts began to deny the enforcement of arbitration
agreements when statutory employment discrimination claims arose in the
nonunion sector. 133 In addition to relying on Alexander as the reason to deny
arbitration of employment discrimination claims, 134 the courts pursued several
other arguments for denying arbitration. Both the inadequacies of arbitration
to decide statutory employment discrimination claims 135 and the need for
predictability in the resolution of disputes" required recognition of an agreement to
arbitrate); see also Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 516 (1974) (noting that
an arbitration agreement was an "indispensable precondition to achievement of orderliness
and predictability essential to any international business transaction"). If international
policy played any substantial role in compelling arbitration of statutory claims, this
rationale was dropped when the Court decided Gilmer, which involved an ADEA claim
between domestic parties with absolutely no international nexus.
Additionally, one should note divergent reactions to arbitral competency among
"commercial" statutory violations and "employment discrimination" statutory violations.
Compare Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 633 (stating that "potential complexity [of
statutory antitrust law] should not suffice to ward off arbitration"), with Barrentine v. City
of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 290 (1984) ("An arbitrator may not... have the expertise
required to resolve the complex legal questions that arise in § 1983 actions.").
133 See generally Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 905 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1990)
(denying arbitration of securities representative's Title VII claims by reliance on
Alexander), vacated 500 U.S. 930, rev'd 939 F.2d 229 (1991) (finding that the Gilmer
decision controlled rather than Alexander such that arbitration of Title VII claims was
required); Utley v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 883 F.2d 184 (1st Cir. 1989) (denying
arbitration of a salesperson's Title VII claims by applying the Alexander line of reasoning);
Nicholson v. CPC Int'l Inc., 877 F.2d 221 (3d Cir. 1989) (refusing to enforce arbitration
of ADEA claims made by attorney and relying on Barrentine for guidance), overruled by
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991); Swenson v. Management
Recruiters Int'l, Inc., 858 F.2d 1304 (8th Cir. 1988) (denying arbitration of Title VII
claims by finding that Alexander's holding derived from Title VII and not the nature of
collective bargaining), overruled by Gilmer, 500 U.S. 20.
134 SeeAlford, 905 F.2d at 106 (stating that "we regard Alexander's rationale as broad
enough to speak to any arbitration of Title VII claims") (emphasis added); see also Utley,
883 F.2d at 187 (noting the mere fact that an employee "signed an individual employment
agreement rather than a collective bargaining agreement as in Alexander is not
significant"); Swenson, 858 F.2d at 1306 ("Although Alexander involves a collective
bargaining agreement, and not a commercial arbitration agreement under the FAA, this fact
should not change the Court's analysis.").
135 "The main problems with arbitration are the lack of expertise of arbitrators, the
inferior fact-finding process, and the inability of arbitration to judicially construe Title VII
by reference to public law concepts." Swenson, 858 F.2d at 1306-1307 (citations omitted);
see also Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 228 (noting the "inadequacy of arbitration... to enforce
the statute effectively," and its lack of power to "award broad equitable relief which courts
have").
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uniform enforcement 36 were advanced to deny employer motions to compel
arbitration. While Alexander had concentrated on the "majoritarian" concerns
of enforced labor arbitration, courts hearing individual claims began to
analyze the unique position of employees who did not have the power of a
bargaining representative to negotiate for them. 137 Furthermore, the decisions
carefully defused arguments made under Mitsubishi Motors for the federal
pro-enforcement attitude toward arbitration in general by stating that the
unique concerns of antidiscrimination statutes warranted different and special
treatment. 13s Thus, courts deferred to the Alexander line of cases and
permitted employees to seek judicial remedy, regardless of arbitration
provisions to the contrary, for violations of discrimination laws. All this,
however, was about to change.
In 1991, Gilmer introduced a radical shift in the Court's attitude toward
arbitration of employment discrimination claims. 139 Robert Gilmer was hired
by Interstate/Johnson Lane (Interstate) as a financial services manager and, as
required, registered as a securities representative with several stock
136 See Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 227-229 (noting that enforcement of ADEA arbitration
would detract from EEOC investigation and enforcement, thereby undermining
congressional design to deter age discrimination through the actions of a centralized public
agency); Swenson, 858 F.2d at 1307 ("Title VII mandates the promotion of public interest
by assisting victims of discrimination. The arbitration process may hinder efforts to carry
out this mandate.").
137 The Nicholson court addressed the issues of both adhesion contracts and the high-
ranking versus low-ranking employee arguments. See Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 229 (noting
the "disparity in bargaining power between an employer and an individual
employee... [that] may lack any realistic option to refuse to sign a standard form
arbitration agreement," and rejecting the idea that professional employees and managerial
employees of higher sophistication did not need protection).
138 The courts hinged on Mitsubishi Motors's language that not all "controversies
implicating statutory rights are suitable for arbitration." Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 627 (1985); see also Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 224;
Swenson, 858 F.2d at 1307. The courts would then find that the congressional intent for
judicial resolution of discrimination claims prevented enforcement of arbitration. See, e.g.,
Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 229-230. Other courts merely refused to find that the Alexander
line of cases had been specifically overruled or modified by the recent "arbitration-
friendly" decisions in the international business cases. See, e.g., Alford, 905 F.2d at 108;
see also Utley, 883 F.2d at 186.
139 For a concise background on Gilmer's roots in the FAA and prior judicial
treatment of employment arbitration agreements, see generally David E. Feller, Fender
Bender or Train Wreck?: The Collision Between Statutory Protection of Individual
Employee Rights and the Judicial Revision of the Federal Arbitration Act, 41 ST. Louis U.
L.J. 561 (1997).
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exchanges. 140 Included among these registrations was the New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE) "Uniform Application for Securities Industry Registration
or Transfer," or "Form U-4," which contained an arbitration provision in
which Gilmer agreed "to arbitrate any dispute, claim or controversy" arising
between him and Interstate (such disputes required arbitration under the NYSE
rules). 141 Following several years of service, Gilmer received his termination
notice at the age of 62. Gilmer promptly submitted age discrimination charges
with the EEOC and then filed ADEA claims in the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of North Carolina. Relying on Gilmer's signed Form U-4 and
the FAA, Interstate filed a motion to compel arbitration. 142 The district court
ruled in favor of Gilmer on the basis of Alexander and congressional intent to
prevent a judicial waiver for resolution of ADEA tlaims. 143 The Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed after finding that nothing in the ADEA
evinced congressional intent to preclude arbitration of claims under the
statute. 144 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve questions of
ADEA arbitrability.
Ultimately, the Court held that an arbitration agreement signed pursuant
to a broker's securities registration application was enforceable, requiring
arbitration of statutory claims under the ADEA. 145 Relying on the liberal
140 See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991).
141 See id. at 23. Under the NYSE rules, any dispute arising over an employee's
termination is subject to arbitration. See id. Other exchanges, including the National
Association of Securities Dealers, incorporate similar provisions in their registration
material and exchange rules. See Williams v. Cigna Fin. Advisors, Inc., 56 F.3d 656, 658
(5th Cir. 1995). Note, however, that the NASD amended its code in 1993 in regard to
arbitration of employment disputes, and some conflicts have arisen over the applicability
of such amendments to securities representatives who completed their initial registration
prior to the changes. See id. at 659 (finding that termination after the amendments took
effect was governed by changes in the NASD code); see also Kuehner v. Dickinson & Co.,
84 F.3d 316, 320 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding that a termination that took place before the
amendments took effect was nonetheless governed by NASD changes when an action was
brought after the amendments took effect). These disputes comprise the larger issue
concerning notice to employees of the arbitrability of their discrimination claims. See
Prudential Ins. Co. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299, 1302-1305 (finding that employees were not
required to arbitrate state law discrimination claims because Form U-4 did not put them on
notice that such claims were arbitrable).
142 See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23-24.
143 See id.
144 See id.
145 See id. at 35.
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federal policy toward arbitration and the language of Mitsubishi Motors,146 the
Court found no inconsistency between the underlying public policy of the
ADEA and arbitral goals under the FAA.147 Following Gilmer's concessions
that nothing in the ADEA's language or legislative history prohibited
arbitration, the Court also found that there was no inherent conflict between
compulsory arbitration and the ADEA's statutory framework and purposes. 148
The Court held that arbitration could further ADEA social policy 149 and that
the decision would not undermine the EEOC's role in enforcement of the
ADEA. 150 In addition, the Court opined that alleged inadequacies of the
arbitral process in handling statutory claims resembled the same general
judicial hostility toward arbitration that the FAA was enacted to reverse. 151
146 See supra note 62 and accompanying text (discussing the Mitsubishi Motors
holding that arbitration is not a waiver of substantive'rights, but only a choice of forum).
147 The Court noted that the language in the ADEA does not militate against
alternative dispute resolution, but instead encourages it. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 27-28.
Importantly, the Court did not reach the issue of whether section 1 of the FAA applied to
"employment contracts" because Gilmer did not raise the issue on appeal. See id. at 25
n.2. Additionally, the Court also indicated that the issue would have remained moot
regardless of whether it was raised on appeal, since a Form U-4 is not an employment
contract, but a contract between the employee and a third party (the NYSE). See id.
Today, the issue of application of section 1 of the FAA to employment contracts
continues without direct guidance from the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Patterson v. Tenet
Healthcare, Inc., 113 F.3d 832 (8th Cir. 1997); Asplundh Tree Expert Co. v. Bates, 71
F.3d 592 (6th Cir. 1995); Crawford v. West Jersey Health Sys., 847 F. Supp. 1232
(D.N.J. 1994). Issues surrounding the "nonemployment contract" characterization of the
Form U-4, however, have been rejected and few employees have challenged this
characterization. See, e.g., Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305, 312 (6th
Cir. 1991); Fletcher v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 619 N.E.2d 998, 1005 (N.Y. 1993).
148 See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26-27, 29 (noting the ADEA's flexible approach to
dispute resolution).
149 " [S]o long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate [his] statutory cause
of action in the arbitral forum, the statute will continue to serve both its remedial and
deterrent function." Id. at 28 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 (1985)).
150 The Court noted that, regardless of an agreement to arbitrate, (1) individuals could
still file EEOC charges, (2) the EEOC's investigatory authority was not compromised, and
(3) nothing indicated that Congress intended the EEOC to be involved in all employment
disputes. See id. at 28-29 (stating that "mere involvement of an administrative agency in
the enforcement of a statute is not sufficient to preclude arbitration").
151 Similar to prior cases, see supra notes 117, 123, 130, 135 and accompanying text,
the Gilmer Court addressed concerns that (1) arbitration would be biased, (2) discovery was
too limited, (3) failure to write arbitral decisions would reduce public knowledge of
discriminatory practices, (4) arbitrators cannot fashion certain types of relief, and (5) there
was disparity in employee-employer bargaining power. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 30-33.
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Finally, the Court distinguished the Alexander, Barrentine, and West
Branch decisions that had permeated discussions of statutory employment
discrimination claim arbitration. Foremost, the majority noted that prior
employment arbitration cases involved collective bargaining agreements. 152
These cases had involved majoritarian concerns because unions, controlled by
the majority of their members, negotiated arbitration clauses, rather than the
individual employee, whose interests could be ignored by the union majority.
When an agreement was made by an individual employee, with majoritarian
involvement absent, the employee could protect her interests; the resulting
contract at least resembled an arm's-length commercial contract between
individual parties, rather than union-imposed terms that all members had to
honor. 153 On this analysis, the Court found that the FAA applied and that the
agreement to arbitrate federal'statutory employment discrimination claims
would be enforced. 154
Following Gilmer, courts have reacted swiffly and expansively toward the
enforcement of arbitration claims arising under federal antidiscrimination
statutes and governed by the FAA. Within one week of the Gilmer decision,
the Court vacated an order denying arbitration of an employee's Title VII
claims, and on remand the court of appeals found that Title VII, like the
ADEA, was arbitrable. 155 Subsequent cases expanded Gilner's reach to
Unlike prior decisions, the Court rejected these generalized attacks and held that
protections built into the FAA and the NYSE rules prevented abuse, NYSE provisions
permitted extensive discovery and written opinions, cases not subject to arbitration would
still be presented in the courts to clarify the law, and the NYSE rules did not restrict the
types of arbitral relief available. See id. Note, however, that the employment discrimination
issues in this case were addressed expressly by the NYSE arbitration rules and that these
rules do not apply to all employment arbitrations. The Court also rejected any generalized
undue influence or coercion claims based solely on the existence of an employee-employer
relationship. See id. at 32-33.
152 See id. at 34-35.
153 The Court elaborated the following three significant distinctions between Gilmer
and the Alexander line of cases: (1) the Alexander cases addressed only whether grievance
arbitration precluded subsequent judicial action and did not involve enforcement of
compulsory arbitration agreements, (2) the Alexander cases involved the presence of
collective bargaining agreements, and (3) the cases were not resolved under the FAA. See'
id. at35.
154 See id. at 35. The dissent railed against the majority's failure to address whether
section 1 of the FAA prohibited enforcement of arbitration agreements within employment
contracts. See id. at 36-43 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent also argued that
compulsory arbitration conflicted with the ADEA's purpose. See id. at 41-42.
155 See Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 905 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1990), vacated
500 U.S. 930, rev'd 939 F.2d 229, 230 (5th Cir. 1991) ("Because both the ADEA and
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include other employment discrimination statutes such as the ADA, 156 the
Civil Rights Act, 157 the Fair Labor Standards Act, 158 the Juror's Act, 159 and
state law statutes. 160 During 1992, federal courts applied Gilmer to
employment contracts in numerous job fields 161 beyond the Form U-4
registrations in the securities industry. 162 As a result of the mass acceptance
of the arbitrability of statutory employment discrimination claims, 163 federal
courts have all relegated such claims to the arbitral arena. However, this
approval should not imply that the propriety of employment discrimination
arbitration under the FAA has become moot. Rather, the law likely will
continue to evolve through numerous challenges and interpretations. Beyond
the EEOC's continued efforts to oppose enforcement of predispute arbitration
agreements concerning workplace discrimination, 164 numerous courts have
Title VII are similar civil rights statutes, and both are enforced by the EEOC.... we have
little trouble concluding that Title VII claims can be subjected to compulsory arbitration.").
156 See generally Golenia v. Bob Baker Toyota, 915 F. Supp. 201 (S.D. Cal. 1996).
157 See generally Maye v. Smith Barney Inc., 897 F. Supp. 100 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)
(compelling arbitration of employee claims under Title VII, the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
and state statutes).
158 See generally Kuehner v. Dickinson & Co., 84 F.3d 316 (9th Cir. 1996)
(compelling arbitration of FLSA claims after an employee failed to demonstrate
congressional intent to prohibit arbitration under the statute).
159 See generally McNulty v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 871 F. Supp. 567
(E.D.N.Y. 1994) (affirming an employer's motion for summary judgment where claims
under the Juror's Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1875(a) (1994), and Title VII had been adjudicated in
arbitration).
160 See, e.g., Johnson v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 530 N.W.2d 790 (Minn. 1995)
(compelling arbitration of the Minnesota Human Rights Act).
161 See supra note 1.
162 See generally DiCrisci v. Lyndon Guar. Bank, 807 F. Supp. 947 (W.D.N.Y.
1992) (applying Gilmer to an employment contract). Although the Gilmer Court expressly
declined to resolve the issue of section 1 of the FAA's exclusion of employment contracts
and further hinted that a Form U-4 was not an employment contract, the lower courts
quickly filled the void with an overwhelming endorsement of arbitrability of individual
employment contracts. Though vestiges of the unresolved issue of FAA applicability
continue to appear in repeated employee attacks on the scope of section 1 of the FAA, no
court considering the issue during the 1990s has adopted an expansive view of section 1 to
exclude all employment contracts. See infra notes 196-199.
163 The reader should note that besides Gilmer's license to arbitrate ADEA claims,
the Supreme Court has never ruled on the mandatory arbitrability of any other federal
antidiscrimination statute. Nor has the Court directly addressed an arbitration provision
appearing in an individual employment contract that requires arbitration of such statutes.
164 See Hansen, supra note 8, at 26 (discussing the EEOC's ongoing efforts to oppose
mandatory arbitration agreements in employment contracts).
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avoided Gilmer through the application of novel arguments.1 65 A powerful
argument against the application of Gilmer arose in Prudential Insurance Co.
v. Lai,166 in which the court held that when the employees signed their Form
U-4s, nothing in the contract put them on notice that they were agreeing to
arbitrate important statutory rights and, accordingly, the court could not
enforce the arbitration provision. 167 While numerous employees continue to
165 See Gibson v. Neighborhood Health Clinics, Inc., 121 F.3d 1126, 1130-1131 (7th
Cir. 1997) (refusing to compel arbitration of ADA and Title VII claims when the employee
had signed an arbitration/employment agreement after beginning work and the employer's
failure to provide consideration for signing made the contract unenforceable); Metz v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 39 F.3d 1482, 1490 (10th Cir. 1994) (finding
employer's conduct constituted a waiver of its right to compel arbitration); Berger v.
Cantor Fitzgerald Sec., 942 F. Supp. 963, 966-967 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding that issues
of misrepresentation, inducement, and unfair dealing required additional discovery on the
employment contract before enforcement of the arbitration provision); Arce v. Cotton Club,
883 F. Supp. 117, 123 (N.D. Miss. 1995) (interpreting the FAA to exclude its application
and then denying arbitration of claims by looking to state contract law).
One is compelled to note, however, that the overwhelming majority of cases are
decided in favor of the employer and most employee defenses are rejected. See Miller v.
Public Storage Management, Inc., 121 F.3d 215, 218-219 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that the
issue of fraud in formation of the contract should be submitted to the arbitrator with the
ADA claims); Matthews v. Rollins Hudig Hall Co., 72 F.3d 50, 54 (7th Cir. 1995)
(holding that the issue of fraudulent inducement concerning contract signing would be
submitted to arbitration with the ADEA claims); EEOC v. Frank's Nursery & Crafts, Inc.,
966 F. Supp. 500, 505 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (restricting the EEOC's ability to bring a Title
VII action because the employee involved had signed an arbitration agreement); Beauchamp
v. Great W. Life Assurance Co., 918 F. Supp. 1091, 1098-1099 (E.D. Mich. 1996)
(finding that Form U-4 was not an adhesion contract, the employee's inability to negotiate
terms was not dispositive, and retention of the signed contract at another facility was not
to the employee's detriment); Cherry v. Wertheim Schroder & Co., 868 F. Supp..830, 835
(D.S.C. 1994) (holding that the employee's failure to pass securities registration exams was
not a defense against enforcement of her Form U-4 agreement to arbitrate); Scott v. Farm
Family Life Ins. Co., 827 F. Supp. 76, 80 (D. Mass. 1993) (applying Gilmer retroactively
to conduct that occurred prior to Gilmer's decision); Dancu v. Coopers & Lybrand, 778
F. Supp. 832, 834 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (finding that the employer's delay and invocation of
extensive discovery did not constitute a waiver of the arbitration provision); Benefits
Communication Corp. v. Klieforth, 642 A.2d 1299, 1304-1305 (D.C. 1994) (finding that
the 1991 amendments to the Civil Rights Act did not overrule Gilmer).
166 42 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir. 1994).
167 See id. at 1305. Lai addressed the "knowing and voluntary" requirement in which
a party must be put on notice that, by signing an arbitration provision, she is waiving
judicial access for any employment discrimination claims. See id. The Lai court
emphasized that even had the employees understood that they were agreeing to a general
arbitration provision, nothing in the agreement purported to state the types of disputes
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use Lai's notice requirement, its success has been minimal. 168 Additionally,
Gilmer has had minimal impact in the unionized sector. The courts, relying
on the Alexander line of cases, continue to grant judicial access when
collective bargaining arrangements are involved. 169
Gilmer has, however, been modified by subsequent decisions that sought
to provide employees further protection. 170
covered by the term, including statutory disputes and civil rights claims. See id. As such,
the court found that the statutory framework of Title VII required employee contracts to
explicitly provide notice of the statute's arbitrability if the employer sought to have these
disputes covered by the agreement. See id.
168 See Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182, 1195-1196 (9th Cir.
1998) (relying on Lai's rationale to hold that Title VII claims are not subject to compulsory
arbitration agreements in employment contracts); Reneteria v. Prudential Ins. Co., 113
F.3d 1104, 1105 (9th Cir. 1997) (following the Lai decision in holding that an employee
was not put on notice by a Form U-4 arbitration provision and therefore arbitration could
not be enforced). But see Cremin v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 957 F.
Supp. 1460, 1474 (N.D. I11. 1997) ("The prevailing view is that Lai is incompatible
with... Gilmer, ignores core principles of contract law, and inappropriately used
legislative history to contradict plain statutory language."); Johnson v. Hubbard Broad.,
Inc., 940 F. Supp. 1447, 1455 (D. Minn. 1996) (stating that "the Court finds the... Lai
decision unpersuasive and declines to apply it"); Beauchamp, 918 F. Supp. at 1096
("Fortunately, [Lai] is not binding precedent because this court is not persuaded by its
reasoning. The portions of the legislative history relied upon by [Lai] are slender
reeds . . ").
Duffield is the most recent Ninth Circuit case inspired by Lai's holding and focuses
intently upon the same portions of legislative history relied upon by Lai. See Duffield, 144
F.3d at 1189-1200 (finding that Congress expressly intended to forbid compulsory
arbitration of Title VII claims). Although thorough in its analysis of Lai and Title VII's
legislative history, Duffield's reliance may suffer the same criticism as Lai insofar as it fails
to provide any additional analysis of the legislative intent surrounding Title VII.
169 See Brisentine v. Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp., 117 F.3d 519, 523-526 (11th
Cir. 1997) (applying an Alexander analysis instead of a Gilmer test to a compulsory
arbitration agreement in a collective bargaining contract); Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc.,
112 F.3d 1437, 1453 (10th Cir. 1997) (rejecting Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass
Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875 (4th Cir. 1996) and adopting the majority view that Alexander
applies in collective bargaining environments), vacated, 118 S. Ct. 2364 (1998); Randolph
v. Cooper Indus., 879 F. Supp. 518, 521-522 (W.D. Pa. 1994) (stating that "the holding
in Gilmer should be narrowly construed and should not extend to discrimination suits
arising under labor contracts"); Claps v. Molitero Stone Sales, Inc., 819 F. Supp. 141,
147 (D. Conn. 1993) (" Gilmer does not alter or undermine the protection established in
[Alexander] against waiver of individual statutory rights through collective-bargaining
agreements."). But see Austin, 78 F.3d at 885 (following Gilmer). The Austin court stated:
Whether the dispute arises under a contract of employment growing out of the
securities registration application, a simple employment contract, or a collective
bargaining agreement, an agreement has yet been made to arbitrate the dispute. So
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Despite some pro-employee decisions, employers appear to have
succeeded in having employment contract arbitration provisions legitimized
and enforced. Yet, issues surrounding the enthusiastic judicial embrace of
employment discrimination claim arbitration are far from fully and
permanently resolved, and employers continue to face uncertainty in the
future. 171 Under the current regime, the Supreme Court has not yet clarified
whether the FAA applies generally to employment contracts or whether and
what kinds of employment discrimination statutory claims (Title VII, ADA,
or ADEA) are arbitrable; nor has the Court resolved a split among the circuits
long as the agreement is voluntary, it is valid, and we are of the opinion it should be
enforced.
Id. at 885.
170 See Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Serv., 105 F.3d 1465, 1482-1483 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
Cole found that, atminimum, Gilmer requires that an employment contract arbitration
provision, if applied to statutory discrimination claims, must demonstrate that it
(1) provides for neutral arbitrators, (2) provides for more than minimal discovery, (3)
requires a written award, (4) provides for all of the types of relief that would
otherwise be available in court, and (5) does not require employees to pay either
unreasonable costs or any arbitrators' fees or expenses as a condition of access to the
arbitration forum.
Id. at 1482. These requirements assure procedural fairness. See id. Cole added an element
by stating that an employer may not require arbitration in which an employee must pay all
or any of the fees associated with arbitration. See id. at 1484 (finding that the requirement
of having an employee pay arbitrator's fees would be analogous to having the same pay a
judge to hear his statutory claims, which is an unheard of proposition). As such, an
employer must bear the cost of arbitrator's fees and therefore provide the employee with
an effective means of vindicating his statutory rights. See id. at 1485; see also Shankle v.
B-G Maintenance Management, No. 96 N 2932, 1997 WL 416405, at *1,*3-*4 (D. Colo.
Mar. 24, 1997) (relying on Cole to require an employer to pay an arbitrator's fees in order
to enforce the arbitration agreement). Although a concern exists that arbitrators may
become biased in favor of the employer who pays all of their fees, an argument is made
that it is "unlikely that the arbitrators would jeopardize their professional reputations,
which depend on their objective neutrality, by favoring an employer over an employee
because the employer pays the bill." Id. at *3.
171 See Margaret A. Jacobs, Firms with Policies Requiring Arbitration Are Facing
Obstacles, WALL ST. J., Oct. 16, 1995, at B5 (noting EEOC movements to restrict
employer-mandated arbitration agreements); Margaret A. Jacobs, Workers Call Some
Private Justice Unjust, WALL ST. J., Jan. 26, 1995, at B1 (noting changing standards by
arbitration services to handle increased use of employment arbitration). Additionally, a
good deal of scholarly criticism has been aimed at the general and virtually unquestioned
acceptance of the Gilmer rule to all facets of employment discrimination. See sources supra
note 8.
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on what standards are applicable to these issues. 172 For employment
arbitrations to continue under the FAA while maintaining proper procedural
and substantive fairness, these issues require further elaboration and comment.
IV. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CLAIMS OF EMPLOYEE DISCRIMINATION
AND OF COMMERCIAL CONTRACT BREACHES
Following Gilmer, one notes the common judicial treatment of commercial
and employment arbitrations. 173 Commercial arbitration has thrived under the
federal policy favoring its use by substantially limiting judicial intervention
into the process and by the courts' standing ready to enforce awards. 174 The
result is a speedier, private, and cost-contained process facilitated by informal
procedural and evidentiary rules and insulated from prolonged judicial review.
These three systemic goals are accomplished by the use of industry experts
and personnel as well as the law's allowance for parties contractually to
structure almost all details of the arbitration. 175 As demonstrated, this process
has recently been infused into the arbitration of statutory claims, including
those founded upon federal employment antidiscrimination rights. 176
As noted above, courts permit arbitrators to resolve an employee's
substantive rights on the theory that an arbitration agreement is not a waiver
of substantive rights, but merely a forum selection clause. 177 Thus, virtually
172 See Gershenfeld, supra note 8, at 249, 261-262.
173 The commonality exists in that both commercial and employment arbitrations are
enforced under the FAA, and the policies and procedures are substantially similar within
both contexts. The reader may note that commercial and organized labor arbitration are
more divergent, insofar as the latter is governed specifically by the policies of the NLRA
and is a single part of a much broader industrial dispute resolution process under the
collective bargaining agreement. See discussion supra notes 96-102 and accompanying text.
174 As discussed earlier, commercial arbitration provides the parties with a faster,
private, and more efficient dispute resolution mechanism. See supra notes 36-38 and
accompanying text. The FAA and the arbitral process itself incorporate these goals by
requiring strict judicial enforcement of arbitration agreements and contractual streamlining
of the procedural process of arbitration.
175 See supra notes 10-38 and accompanying text (discussing the basic characteristics
and purposes of commercial arbitration).
176 See discussion supra notes 50-65, 155-163 and accompanying text (addressing the
Supreme Court's embracement of commercial arbitration of statutory claims arising in
international business and subsequent application of similar principles to statutory
employment discrimination laws).
177 See supra note 62 and accompanying text. Recall that the "forum waiver"
argument for permitting arbitration of statutory claims arose in the international business
context and subsequently was used in employment discrimination claims. See supra note
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any statutory right could be an allowable subject of arbitration insofar as
arbitration permits the full substantive relief as would be available in a court
of law. 178 As long as one accepts that the arbitral process affords the complete
relief provided by Congress, enforcement of a predispute agreement does not
conflict with underlying public policy.1 79 Opponents of employment claims
arbitration argue, however, that the characteristics of commercial arbitration
fail to provide the type of substantive rights and relief for violations of
statutory employee rights as would be available in litigation. 180
62 and accompanying text; see also supra note 132.
178 See discussion supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text. Note that this statement
is a somewhat broad generalization of the arbitrability of statutory claims. Under Mitsubishi
Motors, a two-part test exists for determining whether parties have agreed to arbitrate
statutory claims. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 628 (1985). First, the court decides whether the scope of the arbitration agreement
encompasses the statutory claim. See id. Second, the court considers whether any external
legal constraints bar enforcement of the agreement. See id. When the claim is statutory, the
latter step involves a determination of whether the statute evidences a congressional intent
to prevent arbitration of claims arising under the statute. See id. Congressional intent must
be found within the statute's text or legislative history, or an inherent conflict must exist
between the statute's policy and arbitration. See id. at 628-629. A part of this analysis
includes insuring that an alternative forum affords the same substantive rights as a court of
law so that statutory rights are fully vindicated. See id. at 637. When a party seeking to
stay arbitration fails to demonstrate the requisite congressional intent, the liberal federal
policy toward arbitration generates a presumption in favor of arbitrability. See id. at 628.
This Mitsubishi Motors analysis has been incorporated into determining whether statutory
employment discrimination statutes are arbitrable. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26-33 (1991).
Some cases have extended the Mitsubishi Motors test, but such expansion merely
represents an elaboration of the basic test and can be collapsed to fit the two-prong mold.
See, e.g., Maye v. Smith Barney Inc., 897 F. Supp. 100, 105-106 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)
(arguing for a four-prong test which looks for (1) an agreement to arbitrate, (2) scope of
the agreement, (3) congressional intent to permit arbitration, and (4) whether the separation
of arbitrable claims from the nonarbitrable claims warrants a stay pending arbitration)
(citing Genesco, Inc. v. T. Kakiuchi & Co., 815 F.2d 840, 844 (2d Cir. 1987)).
179 Attacks on employment claims arbitration focus on demonstrating an inherent
conflict between the arbitral process and the congressional policy underlying
antidiscrimination statutes. See, e.g., Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26-33 (noting the petitioner's
argument that arbitration circumvents congressional intent to provide only judicial
enforcement of the ADEA and blocks an intent to have the EEOC enforce claims and that
arbitral procedures fail to provide the protection envisioned by Congress). Many of the
same arguments may be found in any judicial challenge to enforcement of an employment
arbitration agreement.
180 See Hansen, supra note 8, at 26 (stating that the EEOC's opposition to mandatory
employment arbitration focuses on issues of bias, judicial foreclosure, and the courts'
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Given the recent judicial response toward enforcing individual employee
arbitration agreements, 181 an employee who seeks to vindicate her statutory
rights in court faces a high hurdle once the employer files a motion to compel
arbitration. 182 To avoid arbitration, she must show that the Mitsubishi Motors
test 183 is not met. The first section below discusses the common attacks on
employment arbitration agreements under the Mitsubishi Motors test and
primarily focuses on claims that the FAA should not apply to employment
contracts and, alternatively, to the oft-used "parade of horribles." 184 The next
section advocates a series of proposals to address the claims made in the first
section as well as provides a strategy by which individual rights may be
vindicated and protected within a modified, or "hybrid," commercial
arbitration process.
A. Attacking Gilmer: Application of the FAA and the "Parade of
Horribles"
When a party asks the court to enforce a predispute arbitration clause, the
court must assess the agreement to arbitrate under the Mitsubishi Motors test.
A party opposing a motion to compel arbitration must prove to the court that
at least one prong of that test is not satisfied. Thus, an employee who desires
to remain in court must either show that his discrimination claim is not within
the scope of the arbitration agreement or that Congress did not intend for his
particular class of claims to be arbitrated in lieu of judicial enforcement.185
Given Gilmer's overwhelming endorsement of arbitration of statutory
essential role in enforcing civil rights); see also Cooper, supra note 86 (discussing the need
for more stringent guidelines in employment arbitration to protect the ability to vindicate
statutory rights).
181 See supra notes 155-168 and accompanying text (discussing favorable treatment
of employment arbitration of statutory discrimination claims in light of the Gilmer
decision).
182 An employer is not always the one seeking arbitration. Although rare, cases do
exist in which an employee seeks to compel arbitration of his claims against an employer
who attempts to litigate. See, e.g., Asplundh Tree Expert Co. v. Bates, 71 F.3d 592, 602
(6th Cir. 1995) (compelling arbitration of consultant's claims against successor company
that had purchased his employer and then allegedly breached his employment agreement).
183 See supra note 178.
184 Chisolm v. Kidder, Peabody Asset Management, Inc., 966 F. Supp. 218, 221
(S.D.N.Y. 1997). The parade of horribles argument is a series of five common contentions
against the adequacy of arbitration to satisfy the congressional policy bolstering
antidiscrimination statutes. See id. at 221-222.
185 See Johnson v. Hubbard Broad., Inc., 940 F. Supp. 1447, 1457 (D. Minn. 1996)
(allocating the burden of proof to the party challenging a motion to compel arbitration).
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employment discrimination claims, the employee likely has an uphill battle. 186
This is not to say, however, that the employee has no available arguments. 187
The first prong of the Mitsubishi Motors test requires that the dispute at
issue must fall within the scope of the arbitration agreement. 188 An employee
challenge argues that the agreement with the employer was not meant to
include statutory discrimination claims. If a disputed claim is outside the scope
of the arbitration provision, an arbitrator will have no contractual authority to
resolve the claim, and the court may proceed to try the issue. 189
The problem, however, is that the scope of most arbitration agreements
is sufficiently broad to cover virtually any dispute. Most arbitration provisions
are worded to cover all disputes that may arise in the employment context. 190
186 Gilmer cripples employee claims against arbitration in two ways. First, the Court
refused to decide the issue of FAA applicability to employment contracts, thus leaving the
broad sweep of the FAA to extend to virtually all arbitration agreements. See Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 25 (1991). Second, the Court's strong
presumption of arbitrability makes it difficult to demonstrate that Congress intended to
foreclose arbitration of statutory claims and that the arbitral process is inadequate to
vindicate statutory rights. See id. at 26-33. An employee challenging arbitrability must
differentiate her case from that presented in Gilmer.
187 While going through the arguments that follow, the reader should understand that
the party (usually the employee) challenging a motion to compel arbitration will carry the
burden of proving that enforcement of the arbitration agreement fails to meet the Mitsubishi
Motors test. See id. at 26. Again, the authors stress that the liberal policy toward arbitration
makes this burden particularly problematic for the challenging party.
188 This prong effectively bars judicial enforcement of arbitration provisions appearing
in collective bargaining agreements. Because labor arbitrators have authority only to decide
contractual rights, statutory rights are outside the scope of grievance arbitration provisions
and thus fail to meet the first Mitsubishi Motors test prong. See discussion supra notes 113-
114, 178 and accompanying text. This argument does not apply to individually bargained-
for employment arbitration agreements because the majoritarian concerns of labor
agreements, which define and limit the contractual scope of collective bargaining
arrangements, are not present. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 35.
189 See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1994) (providing that a claim must be
referable to the parties' arbitration agreement before a court may enforce the provision).
190 See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23 (involving an NYSE arbitration provision covering
"any dispute, claim or controversy" in employment); Gibson v. Neighborhood Health
Clinics, Inc., 121 F.3d 1126, 1128 (7th Cir. 1997) (involving an employee manual stating
that "the resolution of all disputes, issues, controversies, claims, causes of action or
grievances by an employee against [the employer] shall be through the process of
arbitration"); Powers v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 923 F. Supp. 21, 22 (S.D.N.Y.
1996) (involving an employment contract arbitration provision covering "[all disputes and
controversies of every kind and nature arising out of or in connection with this
agreement").
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Looking only to the contract and given a broad policy in favor of arbitrability,
a court will err in favor of including the dispute within the scope of the
arbitration provision. 191 Unless the employment contract explicitly bars
arbitration of statutory discrimination claims or is very narrowly drafted, a
pro-enforcement reading of the arbitration provision is inevitable, and the
claim will be arbitrated. 192
If the employer satisfies the first Mitsubishi Motors prong, an employee
enjoys perhaps greater room to argue under the second prong, which requires
the court to examine whether any external legal considerations prevent
enforcement of the agreement. 193 Thus, even if a statutory discrimination
dispute is within the scope of an arbitration provision, such provision will be
unenforceable if the employee can demonstrate that existing public policy
prohibits its arbitration. While general attacks on enforcement through the use
of contract law principles have been unavailing, 194 employees have had only
minimal success with the "knowing and voluntary" waiver argument.' 9 5
Failing to prevail under the Mitsubishi Motors test, the employee is left to
argue the two "bread-and-butter" issues that appear in nearly every case
challenging enforcement of an employment contract arbitration provision
covering statutory discrimination claims in dispute.196 These two issues are
191 See Rojas v. TK Communications, Inc., 87 F.3d 745, 748-749 (5th Cir. 1996)
(refusing to interpret narrowly an arbitration agreement so as to place an employee's Title
VII claims outside the provision's scope); Maye v. Smith Barney Inc., 897 F. Supp. 100,
108-109 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (finding that statutory discrimination claims were within the
arbitration provision's scope).
192 The employee's problem is exacerbated whenever the contract explicitly states that
the arbitration provision covers civil rights and statutory claims. See, e.g., Great W.
Mortgage Corp. v. Peacock, 110 F.3d 222, 224-225 (3d Cir. 1997).
193 See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994) (stating that a written arbitration agreement "shall be
valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for
the revocation of any contract") (emphasis added).
194 See cases cited supra note 165 (citing cases in which courts addressed contract law
challenges to employment arbitration provisions).
195 See Prudential Life Ins. Co. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299, 1303-1305 (9th Cir. 1994). The
knowing and voluntary argument involves whether an employee was put on notice that an
arbitration provision included civil rights claims. See id. According to Lai's treatment of
Title VII's legislative history, Congress intended that waiver of judicial access for statutory
right vindication must be known and voluntary at the time the party signed the contract. See
id. While Lai would require that either the contract explicitly list the employee rights
covered or have the employer otherwise place the employee on notice, this requirement has
been criticized by a significant number of other courts and is not commonly accepted. See
discussion supra notes 166-168 and accompanying text.
196 Many employees challenging a motion to compel arbitration will cite to the
principles espoused in the Alexander line of cases. See, e.g., Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec.
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FAA applicability and an inherent conflict between statutory rights and
arbitration of such rights.
First, most employees challenge the application of the FAA to enforce an
employment contract provision. Even if an arbitration provision covers a
statutory claim, the inapplicability of the FAA may preclude enforcement of
the agreement and thereby mandate judicial hearing.197 An employee will
claim that the language of section 1 of the FAA, which excludes the
"contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class
of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce," will exclude his
employment contract arbitration provision from the scope and effect of the
FAA.1 98
While the inapplicability of the FAA to employment contracts is a
standard argument in statutory discrimination claim cases, 199 the argument
fails. Although the interpretation of section 1 has garnered a number of
constructions, 200 the general consensus is that the section is limited to
Serv., 105 F.3d 1465, 1472-1479 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (analyzing differences between
collective bargaining arbitration and individual employee contract arbitration provisions).
Following the decision of Gilmer, the authors have found no case in which the court
accepted an individual employee's use of the Alexander line of cases to defeat a motion to
compel arbitration and, as such, the authors will not discuss this "argument."
197 Even if the FAA does not apply, state arbitration law nevertheless may require
enforcement. This result is probable in states that have adopted the Uniform Arbitration
Act, which expressly includes employment contract arbitration agreements. See discussion
supra note 9.
198 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
19 9 The argument is "standard" insofar as the Supreme Court refused to provide any
guidance in Gilmer as to the FAA's applicability and in fact sidestepped the issue by
declaring that the Form U-4 was not an employment contract. See Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 25 n.2 (1991). Thus, the decision left the door
open for parties to argue the issue until either the Court or Congress resolves the issue with
a final, definitive rule.
200 See generally Finkin, supra note 10 (discussing the evolution of section 1 of the
Federal Arbitration Act as applied to employment contracts). One of the most cited
constructions involves the use of ejusdem generis, so that the specific terms involving
'seamen" and "railroad employees" limit the scope of "other employees" to those who
are directly engaged in interstate transport occupations. See Cole, 105 F.3d at 1471.
Additionally, courts have argued that broadly reading the "any other class of workers"
language would render the preceding language redundant, which would be odd if Congress
merely wanted to exclude all employment contracts. See id. Further, the Supreme Court
differentiated the narrow " in commerce" language of section 1 with the broad " involving
commerce" language of section 2, which means that the Court impliedly limits the
application of section 1. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Co. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 275-277
(1995); see also Cole, 105 F.3d at 1471 (citing Allied-Bruce Terminix, 513 U.S. at 275-
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employment contracts involving those who work directly in interstate
commerce, such as truck drivers and airline pilots. 20 ' Jurisdictions have
adopted a narrow reading of section 1, and only one court has interpreted the
section broadly to include all employment contracts. 20 2 While the argument
is worth making, an employee can predict, unfortunately, that the court will
deny any challenge to FAA applicability when the dispute involves an
individual employment contract.
Failing to succeed with arguments against FAA applicability, the
employee has only one other significant argument against enforcing
arbitration. The employee must demonstrate that Congress did not intend to
permit parties to waive judicial resolution of discrimination claims. An
employee may prove this by showing that either the statute's text or legislative
history displays such an intent or, alternatively, that an inherent conflict exists
between the congressional purpose in enacting the statute and the arbitral
process. 20 3 Thus far, employees relying on the statutory text and legislative
histories of federal antidiscrimination statutes to show congressional intent to
prohibit arbitration have failed to win the courts' favor. 2°4 Once a court has
found that the text and history of a federal discrimination statute do not
expressly prohibit arbitration, an employee's remaining recourse is to argue
that an inherent conflict exists between congressional purpose and arbitral
process.
277).
201 See Erving v. Virginia Squires Basketball Club, 468 F.2d 1064, 1068-1069 (2d
Cir. 1972); Signal-Stat Corp. v. Local 475, United Elec. Workers, 235 F.2d 298, 301-303
(2d Cir. 1956); Tenney Eng'g, Inc. v. United Elec. Workers, Local 437, 207 F.2d 450,
452-454 (3d Cir. 1953); Kropfelder v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 859 F. Supp. 952, 955-959
(D. Md. 1994).
202 See United Elec. Workers v. Miller Metal Prod., Inc., 215 F.2d 221, 224 (4th
Cir. 1954) (finding that the legislative history of the FAA clearly demonstrated that the Act
was to apply only to commercial arbitration and not to employment disputes).
203 An additional argument may be that such a contract violates public policy and
therefore is unenforceable as a matter of law. See Hoffman, supra note 8, at 149-152. This
argument, however, is based in part on the Lai decision and thus may be questioned by the
courts that have questioned Lai. See supra notes 166-168 and accompanying text.
204 Some isolated controversy has surrounded the language and amendment of the
Civil Rights Act of 1991. See discussion supra note 90 and accompanying text. However,
the text and legislative histories of most of the antidiscrimination statutes have been
uniformly interpreted as permitting, and even endorsing, resolution through alternative
dispute methods. See supra notes 89-93 and accompanying text. As such, an employee may
be forced to concede that the language and history of a statute do not directly support his
position and instead must argue an inherent conflict. See, e.g., Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26-27.
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A successful employee argument of the inherent conflict between policy
and process requires an employee to demonstrate that Congress's goal in
enacting the particular federal civil rights statute is frustrated by permitting
arbitration of claims arising under the statute. Although acceptable as a
"forum-shifting" procedural process, arbitration must provide the same
substantive relief as a judicial forum.20 5 If an employee can show that the
arbitral process likely will deny or significantly impair vindication of her
substantive rights, the employee demonstrates an inherent conflict between
congressional intent to protect certain legislatively created individual rights
and an out-of-court process that cannot adequately vindicate those rights. The
common method by which an employee accomplishes this argument is by
contending that the special rules and characteristics of arbitration make such
a forum inappropriate to resolve sensitive antidiscrimination claims. These
generalized attacks on the arbitral process to prove an inherent conflict are
labeled the "parade of horribles." 20 6 This parade consists of five vehicles to
convey the employee's argument.
First, employees argue that arbitrators likely will be biased in favor of
employers. 207 Because the FAA permits parties to agree on the selection
process for arbitrators, 20 8 an employer that drafts an employment agreement
may "stack the deck" in its favor by providing for the selection of arbitrators
who will side with the employer. This apprehension can arise from either of
two scenarios. One, an employer may retain contractual authority to designate
the members of the panel and thereby chose "nonneutrals" who are
205 See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.614, 628,
637 (1985) (stating that agreeing to arbitrate statutory claims "does not forego the
substantive rights afforded by the statute" and "so long as the prospective litigant
effectively may vindicate its statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute will
continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent function" as intended by Congress); see
also Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 27-28 (noting that so long as an employee may vindicate his
substantive statutory rights in arbitration, nothing should bar enforcement of an otherwise
valid arbitration agreement).
206 Chisolm v. Kidder, Peabody Asset Management, Inc., 966 F. Supp. 218, 221-222
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (providing the five common arguments against the arbitral process that
employees use when challenging employment arbitration agreement enforcement).
207 See, e.g., Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 30; see also Berger, supra note 7, at 715-718
(arguing that an employer should not be allowed to preselect arbitrators and that, over time,
specialists will emerge to represent employee interests in arbitration); Maltby, supra note
8, at 18-22 (arguing that the best method to insure impartiality is to remove the .choice of
arbitrator from the parties).
208 See 9 U.S.C. § 5 (1994) (providing for appointment of arbitrators).
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promanagement. 20 9 Two, if an employee is allowed to participate in panel
selection, the employer, unlike the employee, is a repeat player in the
arbitration game. 210 Thus, an arbitrator will experience pressure to side with
the employer, even if not always, to ensure his future selection and continued
income. 211 Because the purpose of many federal antidiscrimination statutes is
to avoid decisions of biased state courts, arbitration would appear to constitute
an invidious reversion to the specter of congressionally condemned prejudice.
Second, many employment contracts often are, or are analogous to,
contracts of adhesion when the terms are presented on a take-it-or-leave-it
basis. 212 Generally, a job applicant will have to sign an employment contract
before she begins working, and an existing employee may have the terms of
her agreement modified on penalty of termination if she does not consent to
an arbitration agreement. 213 The choice is simple: agree to the contract or look
209 See Berger, supra note 7, at 716.
210 See Grodin, supra note 1, at 43-44 (noting that repeat player status may influence
arbitrator decisions and also provides the employer with knowledge of the prior decision
history of the individual).
211 See id. at 43 (stating that while arbitrators may not consciously make decisions to
favor repeat player employers, they may unconsciously skew decisions or balance the
victories and losses of a repeat player to insure future employment).
212 See Chisoln v. Kidder, Peabody Asset Management, Inc., 966 F. Supp. 218, 224-
225 & n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). This argument has received extensive treatment in the context
of the Form U-4. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 32-33; see also Beauchamp v. Great W. Life
Assurance Co., 918 F. Supp. 1091, 1098 (E.D. Mich. 1996) (finding that Form U-4 was
not a contract of adhesion merely because the employee was required to sign the form
without a reasonable opportunity to negotiate its terms). Adhesion and bargaining power
issues also arise in other employment contracts. See Great W. Mortgage Corp. v. Peacock,
110 F.3d 222, 227-228 (3d Cir. 1997).
213 See Hoffman, supra note 8, at 153 ("When employees are forced to choose
between signing an arbitration agreement and losing their jobs, they are not faced with any
meaningful choice regarding arbitration."); Maltby, supra note 8, at 8 ("The reality is that
Gilmer was required to accept NYSE arbitration as a condition of employment. To have
resisted arbitration would have cost him his job. To imply that NYSE arbitration was the
mutual desire of the parties is naive at best.") (footnote omitted). But see Gilmer, 500 U.S.
at 33 ("Mere inequality in bargaining power, however, is not a sufficient reason to hold
that arbitration agreements are never enforceable in the employment context.");
Beauchamp, 918 F. Supp. at 1098 (" [T]here is no evidence that the [employee] could not
have worked as an insurance salesperson without signing such a form. Even if she couldn't
have worked for defendants, she very well may have been able to work elsewhere.").
The reader should note that courts are likely to apply greater scrutiny when an
employer amends an existing contract or requires a new agreement after the employee has
started working, especially when the employer may leverage its position with threats of
termination if the employee does not agree. See, e.g., Gibson v. Neighborhood Health
Clinics, Inc., 121 F.3d 1126 (7th Cir. 1997); see also Berger, supra note 7, at 713
[Vol. 14:1 1998]
ARBITRATION LAW MODIFICATIONS TO PROTECT STATUTORY RIGHTS
for other employment. Unlike sophisticated parties in arm's-length commercial
transactions, employees may lack the personal economic security and effective
bargaining power to avoid the promise to arbitrate.214 Ergo, the contract may
not be dictated by financial exigency and without the give-and-take
characteristic of truly commercial dealings. Arbitration, then, is viewed not
as a "choice," but as a unilaterally imposed condition.
Third, arbitration relaxes beneficial procedural and evidentiary rules
available in a judicial forum.215 While the federal statutes have provided broad
procedural standards and discovery in discrimination cases, the arbitral
process may serve to confine the employee's opportunity to present fully his
claim. 216 Unlike commercial disputes, discrimination claims generally must
(discussing differences between pre-employment and existing employment agreements to
arbitrate). Additionally, similar issues arise when an "agreement" appears in an employee
manual. See Patterson v. Tenet Healthcare, Inc., 113 F.3d 832, 835 (8th Cir. 1997)
(finding that an arbitration clause in an employment handbook was a separable and valid
contract). Enhanced scrutiny is also applied when an existing agreement changes during the
course of employment. See discussion supra note 141 and accompanying text (addressing
how courts treated the NASD's changes to its code and their subsequent impact on existing
agreements).
214 Beyond issues of whether an employee is sophisticated enough to interpret the
effect of a provision, further problems exist concerning whether the status, importance, and
bargaining strength of an employee can prevent employers from unilaterally demanding
employee submission to an arbitration agreement. See Maltby, supra note 8, at 9 ("What
is really at stake... is the ability of an employer to require its employees to waive
statutory rights as a condition of employment.").
215 Within the commercial arena, parties forego procedural and evidentiary strictures
in order to resolve disputes more quickly and to reduce costs. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S.
427, 438 (1953). Opponents to employment arbitration, however, argue that the process
is inadequate since complex statutory discrimination claims are fact intensive and require
extensive discovery and procedural protection. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 31; see also
Johnson v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 530 N.W.2d 790, 802-803 (Minn. 1995) (stating that
"[a]Ithough arbitration procedures might not be as extensive as those used in courts, by
agreeing to arbitrate .... [parties forego judicial procedure] 'for the simplicity,
informality, and expedition of arbitration'") (quoting Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 31 (quoting
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985))).
216 Courts may worry that "records of arbitration proceedings are incomplete,
discovery is abbreviated, [and that] cross-examination and testimony under oath may be
limited or unavailable." Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Serv., 105 F.3d 1465, 1478 (D.C. Cir.
1997). But see Berger, supra note 7, at 720 ("Arbitration entails no inherent
limitations .... Discovery limitations... are in fact more imagined than real. Arbitrators
can be vested with subpoena power.., and this authority should be more than adequate
to provide.., all [the] necessary information.") (footnotes omitted); Maltby, supra note
8, at 26 ("But justice does not reside in elaborate procedural rules.").
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rely on intricate patterns of circumstantial evidence from which intent and
improper actions can be inferred and the case decided. 217 Limiting discovery
may limit one's ability to demonstrate adequately a continuing and identifiable
discriminatory practice. 218 Remember also, the courts hold that arbitration
must only guarantee the same substantive relief as a court, not the same
procedural protections. 219 Thus, it would appear that an arbitrator could
devise rules that make the claimant's proof more difficult than could a judge,
so long as the substantive relief was not thereby unattainable and the arbitrator
acts within the confines of the arbitration agreement.
Fourth, the public policies condemning discrimination are thwarted by
enforcing arbitration. 220 The statutes provided a federal forum for relief, but
the current policy permits the forum to be waived in favor of a private
resolution outside of the courts. 221 Moreover, the statutes are designed to
prevent discrimination by instituting a public mechanism for investigation,
enforcement, disclosure, and uniform application of the law. 222 When claims
are arbitrated, however, proceedings occur behind closed doors, beyond
public scrutiny, and even unknown to interested agencies of the
government. 223 Further, the lack of written opinions and different notions of
217 But see Maltby, supra note 8, at 26 ("In large and complex cases ... protracted
discovery is often essential. The typical employment dispute, by contrast, generally
involves the single question of the reason the employer terminated ... a single employee.
The relevant information is confined to a handful of people ... and a few
documents. ... ").
218 See Chisolm v. Kidder, Peabody Asset Management, Inc., 966 F. Supp. 218, 225
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (discussing how arbitral rules in the interest of expediency may foreclose
a presentation of a complex and continuing picture of discrimination).
219 See discussion supra notes 61-62, 93 and accompanying text.
220 See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 28, 32 (noting and subsequently rejecting petitioner's
claim that "arbitration procedures cannot adequately further the purposes of the ADEA");
see also Patterson v. Tenet Healthcare, Inc., 113 F.3d 832, 838 (8th Cir. 1997) (stating
that any gaps left in public policy through arbitration of public laws will be filled by the
EEOC and parties who are not subject to arbitration agreements); McNulty v. Prudential-
Bache Sec., Inc., 871 F. Supp. 567, 570-571 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (analyzing whether public
policy of Title VII can be met through arbitration). Often, the issue of public policy arises
when a party asserts that Congress did not intend to permit parties to resolve disputes by
waiving judicial access. See Hoffman, supra note 8, at 149 (discussing the public policy
defense and noting claims alleging that Congress intended for parties to litigate civil rights
claims only through the courts).
221 See Cremin v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 957 F. Supp. 1460,
1471 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
222 See id.; see also supra notes 84-88 and accompanying text (discussing the EEOC).
223 " [Cjlaims that statutory rights have been violated rest upon legislative enactments,
and as such add the interest of the public to what would otherwise be a purely private
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justice by various arbitrators make uniform treatment of discrimination
unlikely.224 Unlike commercial disputes, every employment arbitration
concerning statutory discrimination carries a rich blend of fairness toward the
employee, the employer's right to manage its workforce, and public interest.
The alternative to litigation is a lopsided exchange to achieve speed, privacy,
and cost containment. 225
Lastly, employees claim that statutory rights would not be vindicated. 226
While courts opine that the same substantive relief must be available to a
claimant, as a practical matter no mechanism exists for a court to require that
the arbitrator provide it. Further, inexperienced arbitrators may lack the skill
and wisdom to follow the nuances of discrimination in the employer-employee
relationship and for any number of reasons, fail to apply the law as Congress
dispute between the parties." Berger, supra note 7, at 718.
224 See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 31-32 (rejecting the contention that failure to issue
written arbitration opinions will result in a "lack of public knowledge of employers'
discriminatory policies, an inability to obtain effective appellate review, and a stifling of
the development of the law"). Some commentators argue that written awards are necessary
if there is to be any meaningful judicial review of arbitral decisions in statutory
employment discrimination claim cases. See Grodin, supra note 1, at 47 (alleging that the
lack of a written award serves to protect awards from judicial review, but that "a rule
which insulates the award from judicial review [particularly in the stacked deck situation
of employment arbitration] is hardly neutral").
225 As one commentator has noted:
Full trial procedures go beyond what is needed to insure objectivity and equity in an
arbitration setting. Conversely, the absence of any procedural requirements applied
to arbitrations virtually insures that the proceedings will not be fair. The correct
intermediate standard is the one that ensures fair and predictable procedures without
compromising the independence and expediency of arbitration.
Maltby, supra note 8, at 17. Additionally, "[a]longside the advantages of
arbitration... [including] cost reduction, increased efficiency, and expedited dispute
resolution, there exist several distinct disadvantages." Hoffman, supra note 8, at 133.
226 See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 32 (noting that petitioner argued that arbitrators lack
certain judicial authority to declare remedies); Johnson v. Hubbard Broad., Inc., 940 F.
Supp. 1447, 1458-1459 (D. Minn. 1996) (rejecting an employee's view that arbitration
erodes rights under Title VII). This argument also applies to employees who may claim that
state law rights assure vindication in a judicial forum. See Great W. Mortgage Corp. v.
Peacock, 110 F.3d 222, 231 (3d Cir. 1997); see also supra note 73 (noting the FAA's
preemption of state statutes requiring judicial fora for resolution of statutory claims). One
commentator has argued that mandatory arbitration "vitiates many of the individual rights
delineated in the employment discrimination statutes." Hoffman, supra note 8, at 157.
These rights include "right of access to a federal or state court ... and the right to trial by
a presumably impartial judge or jury." Id.
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intended the protection sought. 227 Additionally, judicial review of any arbitral
decision would be limited by the FAA and offer only a narrow window of
opportunity to nullify the most egregious of arbitral errors. 228
If Gilmer adequately addressed and authoritatively resolved many of the
"procedural" concerns that arise in the arbitration of statutory discrimination
claims, why does the parade of horribles march on through the current case
law? The answer involves the undisputable fact that arbitrations are conducted
under contractual terms that set varying procedures and guidelines from
arbitration to arbitration. While Gilmer was decided in the context of the
NYSE arbitration rules and procedures, 229 other employment contracts employ
disparate procedures and guidelines for arbitration. 230 Whenever a court faces
a heretofore unseen arbitration format, the court must evaluate the procedural
character in the context of prior case law and the sometimes shadowy
boundaries of the discrimination statutes. Thus, courts are left to navigate
through recurring issues without any clear mandate on what is and what is not
acceptable. 231 The following section proposes a number of legislative
possibilities to rectify the courts' predicament and solidify standard guidelines
for the ongoing application of commercial arbitration principles to claims of
statutory employment discrimination.
227 See Chisolm v. Kidder, Peabody Asset Management, Inc., 966 F. Supp. 218,
225-226 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); see also Maltby, supra note 8, at 22-23 (calling for seasoned
arbitrators who have both a knowledge of the industry and the applicable law).
228 See supra notes 17-20, 28-35 and accompanying text (discussing limited judicial
review under the FAA). Some commentators argue for increased availability for judicial
review. See Berger, supra note 7, at 719. Others argue that reviewability should remain
substantially the same. See Maltby, supra note 8, at 25. As with purely commercial
arbitration, an overwhelming factor in limiting judicial review is cost containment. See id.
(noting the need for final arbitral awards if an impecunious employee is to be upon the
same footing with wealthy corporations that can bear the cost of continued litigation).
229 See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 30-33. Notably, the NYSE arbitration rules provide
procedural protections, provide extensive discovery, require written awards, and afford
broad arbitral power to fashion relief. See id.
230 See generally Gershenfeld, supra note 8. Gershenfeld's article examines the
evolving guidelines and procedures that several arbitration services are developing to
address the unique concerns of employment arbitration, as well as the results of two reports
examining the current state of the law. Many of the results demonstrate disparate
conclusions. See id. at 255. For instance, the ability to appeal an arbitral decision and the
procedural guidelines for such differed for all the listed organizations. See id.
231 While courts may recognize that commercial arbitration procedures are somewhat
inadequate to protect the employees from discriminatory practices, no generally applicable
law exists to assess the situation in each instance. Instead, courts are left to apply the FAA
and then engage in a piecemeal assessment of minimum arbitral requirements by matching
the arbitration procedures in question with the existing case law.
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B. "Hybrid" Arbitration: Proposed Modifications to the Current
Employment Arbitration Regimen
Commercial arbitration has proven an invaluable mechanism for dispute
resolution among those who seek levels of efficiency and privacy generally not
available in court systems. Commercial-type arbitration has been extended to
cover individual employment disputes, but arguably as a threat to the
protection and vindication of employee rights. Threats arise in part from
uncertainties that surround the application of various contractual arbitration
procedures to civil rights claims that may require delicate procedural
treatment. Courts have probably traveled too far down the pro-enforcement
road to return to pre-Gilmer denials of statutory employment discrimination
claim arbitration. 232 Thus, the most practicable and justifiable alternative is to
develop a modified arbitration law for employer-employee disputes-one that
addresses current concerns through a "hybrid" form of existing arbitration
law.
As noted above, the availability of myriad arbitration rules results in a
continuous procession of employee claims arguing that certain specific aspects
of a given arbitration procedure frustrate congressional intent to protect
statutory rights.2 33 The solution to this compounding parade of horribles is a
federally mandated set of uniform requirements that provides certain minimum
procedural protections whenever statutory employment discrimination claims
are arbitrated. 234 These rules would apply to every arbitration procedure that
addressed statutory employment discrimination claims and thus would resolve
232 One commentator has stated that:
The trend toward settling employment disputes ... in private arbitration is real,
large, and irreversible .... The question is whether private arbitration will become
a fair and reasonable alternative to the civil courts which the average person can
afford, or whether it will become a corporate coliseum that employees will be forced
into like so many early Christians, and with equal chances of success.
Maltby, supra note 8, at 28-29. The trend toward arbitration is both a result and an
exacerbation of spiraling litigation costs and lengthening court backlogs. See Berger, supra
note 7, at 721; see also discussion supra notes 7, 85 and accompanying text (addressing the
cost of litigating an employment claim and the rise in total claims over the past 20 years).
233 See supra note 229 (discussing how Gilmer addressed the employees' claims only
in the context of the NYSE arbitration rules).
234 Whether such requirements would, or should, extend to those arbitrations that
address other statutory rights is beyond the scope of this Article, and the authors here focus
solely upon arbitrations that involve statutory discrimination claims in the employment
context.
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the fragmented analyses that courts currently must apply whenever an
employee challenges a specific arbitration agreement or procedure.2 35 The
mechanism to accomplish such a sweeping alteration of the existing case law
must arise from federal legislation. The authors therefore focus on the FAA
as the means to effectuate the proposals. 236
Before presenting the proposals, a brief treatment of the expected reaction
of opponents of employment arbitration is appropriate. Following Gilmer,
proponents of arbitration have opined and courts have held that detractors'
arguments are reminiscent of the pre-FAA judicial hostility toward
arbitration. 237 Concerns that the arbitral process lacks the experience,
impartiality, and protections of a judicial forum ring with the same high-
pitched tone once used to challenge commercial arbitration. 238 Further, so
long as an arbitration can promise the same substantive relief to a claimant,
the process is equivalent to court proceedings.2 39 The proarbitration argument
concludes by noting that, should errors or impartialities taint an arbitral
235 Note that the authors propose to use the FAA as the mechanism of enforcement
and, as such, do not intend to include collective bargaining agreement arbitration
procedures within the scope of the proposed amendments. Instead, union-represented
employees may continue to rely on the Alexander line of cases and will retain access to
judicial fora for their statutory claims. See supra notes 96-138 and accompanying text
(discussing treatment of statutory employment discrimination claims in the collective
bargaining field).
236 Much of the existing commentary focuses upon guidelines that a court should adopt
when reviewing employment arbitration agreements. See, e.g., Grodin, supra note 1.
However, the views presented here focus exclusively upon legislative enactment of
guidelines. The FAA is the prime candidate to embody the proposed regulations insofar as
the Act provides enforcement authority, comprises the federal law of arbitration, and
provides the basic structure for modification, rather than the development of a new
employment arbitration law substantially divergent from commercial arbitration law.
Note that the focus upon the FAA is not meant to preclude similar changes to
arbitration law as embodied within the Uniform Arbitration Act. Rather, jurisdictions
adopting the UAA into state law are subject to preemption by the provisions of the FAA
and, as such, the importance of amending the FAA takes precedence over emendation of
state arbitration law. See supra notes 55, 73 (discussing FAA preemption).
237 See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 30 (1991)
("[G]eneralized attacks on arbitration 'res[t] on suspicion of arbitration as a method of
weakening the protections afforded in the substantive law to would-be complainants,' and
as such, they are 'far out of step with our current strong endorsement of the federal statutes
favoring this method of resolving disputes."') (quoting Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 481 (1989)).
238 See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 30.
239 See id. at 28.
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decision, sections 10 and 11 of the FAA will adequately protect an employee
from arbitral failures in resolving her claim. 240
.Although employment arbitration proponents are correct in their
understanding of commercial arbitration law, their reaction fails to rectify
fully the differences that do exist between purely commercial and employment
arbitration. Commercial arbitration has been developed over the course of
seventy-five years, and the practice has been molded satisfactorily to fit
established goals.241 Arbitral relaxation of judicial rules and insulation from
court review on the merits of the claim have promoted the efficiency that
arm's-length commercial parties consider advantageous when selecting this
alternative to litigation.2 42 Arbitrators familiar with the industry have added
integrity to the dispute process by applying their expertise to business contract
interpretations that rely heavily upon industry practices and customs. The form
of voluntary arbitration is compatible with the commercial function.
Employment arbitration outside the collective bargaining sector, on the
other hand, is a more recent development, only about a decade old.2 43 As its
popularity has increased among employers, the newer process apes the
processes of traditional commercial arbitration under the FAA. The function,
however, is different. The focus is not centered on private commercial
agreements, often for the sale of goods or services, but rather on the violation
of rights extended by the federal government to members of the national
workforce. An employee may not be the same type of arm's-length party to
a commercial agreement, especially where the rights consist of nonnegotiable
statutory protections from discrimination. 244 Efficiency in resolving legal
controversies with finality must be weighed against a public interest to enforce
240 See 9 U.S.C. §§ 10, 11 (1994); see also Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 30-31 (noting
procedural protections implicit in the FAA that address arbitrator bias and provide for
judicial review in the event of a violation). The two cited sections of the FAA provide the
bases upon which a court may vacate, modify, or correct an arbitral award and generally
protect against errors that occur in the arbitral process. See supra notes 28-35 and
accompanying text (discussing the FAA provisions for judicial review and alteration of an
arbitration award).
241 See supra Part II.
242 See supra Part II.
243 See supra Part III.B. Although labor arbitration law has developed over a
substantial amount of time, its evolution is not applicable to the current state of individual
employment arbitration law because Gilmer effectively switched the analysis from the labor
arbitration context (relying on the Alexander line of cases) to the commercial arbitration
context (relying on Mitsubishi Motors and the FAA). See supra Part III.B.
244 See discussion supra notes 212-214 and accompanying text (addressing employee
claims of adhesion and unequal bargaining power).
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rights designed to end impermissible discriminatory practices. 245 Further, an
expert, say in the textile industry, is no better equipped to decide
discrimination claims of a fabrics plant employee than is an expert in the high
technology sector because discrimination claims rely on statutory grounds that
may have nothing to do with the manufacturing and sales practices of the
industry. 246 Although form is the same, the function is not mere business
efficiency, but in addition the maintenance of protections and rights afforded
employees-persons who must support themselves financially and any
dependants as well. 247
The solution is to modify the arbitral form to fit the function. If arbitration
must be simultaneously efficient and protective of unique federally-created,
important rights, the commercial form of arbitration should be modified to
accommodate the policy underlying those rights. In addition to clarifying the
scope of the FAA, the authors propose five requirements of employment
arbitration to supplement current procedures.
The initial step toward modification of employment arbitration law is to
clarify section 1 of the FAA.248 Although the judiciary has provided a fairly
245 "[A]rbitration should be recognized for what it can offer and be applied in a
manner which is adapted to the unique aspects of employment law dispute resolution. This
may mean the modification of some principles . . . ." Berger, supra note 7, at 721; see
also Cooper, supra note 86, at 204 ("Arbitration can be a case of the fox guarding the
chickens, or an expeditious route to justice. Which it is depends on the specific provisions
of the arbitration system devised.").
246 See Hoffman, supra note 8, at 133 (noting that many arbitrators were "not
necessarily employment discrimination law experts," which seems to violate a call for
arbitrators who are versed in the substantive law of their respective field). A possible
compromise to this dilemma is to employ arbitrators who are either labor attorneys or
nonlegal personnel who have served with employment agencies such as the EEOC or the
National Labor Relations Board. See Maltby, supra note 8, at 22-23. Whether this concern
is valid, however, is questioned by at least one study that found that judges and arbitrators
(whether employment discrimination experts or not) often decide cases in the same way and
with a low rate of judicial interference with arbitral awards. See Cooper, supra note 86,
at 238-239.
247 In other words:
Judging whether employment law ADR represents a net positive benefit is thus a
different calculation [from commercial arbitration law]. The weighing of gains and
losses must account for not only the structural features of the litigation and ADR
processes, but also the practical reality of employment law dispute resolution as it
currently exists.
Berger, supra note 7, at 698.
248 See supra notes 197-202 and accompanying text (discussing interpretation of
section 1 of the FAA's exclusionary language for employment contracts).
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uniform interpretation of the section's scope, with only one court finding a
broad interpretation, the issue continues to arise in employee challenges to
employment arbitration. 249 A final, definitive interpretation remains uncertain
insofar as the Supreme Court has refused fully to address the issue. Although
the supporting case law and mass acceptance of a narrow interpretation hints
that the Court would support the majority view, reliance on the FAA's general
applicability to employment contracts and continuing challenges remain
precariously balanced. Resolution of the issue, however, does not require the
Court's involvement. Instead, a legislative amendment to the language of
section 1 would be appropriate. The FAA merely needs clarification of the
scope of its employment contract exclusion. 250 Congress is aware of the trend
toward arbitration of rights that it created to end discrimination, and of
employment arbitration in general, such that a call for clarification is timely
and necessary to avoid unnecessary litigation.251
249 See supra notes 197-202.
250 This result could be accomplished by explicitly limiting the exclusion to "other
class[es] of workers [directly] engaged in foreign or interstate commerce, [such as
interstate transport occupations]," or by expanding inclusion within section 2 by enforcing
an arbitration agreement in any "maritime transaction, [individual employment contract for
employee not represented under a collective bargaining agreement], or a contract
evidencing a transaction involving commerce." 9 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1994) (authors' proposals
for amendment appearing in brackets). Given the difficulty of defining "directly engaged
in interstate commerce" within an exclusion, see Kropfelder v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 859
F. Supp. 952, 955-959 (D. Md. 1994) (attempting to determine if the manager for a
warehouse that was a focal point for interstate commerce was "directly engaged" in
interstate commerce under section 1), the latter option stating broad inclusion is preferable,
though some emendation still would be required of section 1 to insure that no conflict was
established between the existing language of that section and any new inclusion provision
in section 2. The authors recognize that the drafting of any inclusion or exclusion requires
intensive consideration and precision, particularly in the employment context, and the
above suggestions are intended as examples rather than exact proposals.
251 Thus far, Congress's predominant role has been to carve exemptions within
specific statutes to prevent arbitration. See supra note 178 and accompanying text (detailing
an analysis for determination of whether Congress has intended to preclude judicial
waiver); see also infra note 273 and accompanying text (addressing recent congressional
proposals to amend public laws to prevent enforcement of predispute arbitration agreements
covering claims arising under such laws). While Congress has not acted in one fell swoop
to exclude all employment arbitration from FAA enforcement, the rationale for the
simultaneous piecemeal exclusionary provisions adopted on a statute-by-statute basis clearly
indicates that Congress does not view employment arbitration as beneficial in all cases.
This result, however, has left the courts an arduous task of analyzing the statutes
individually rather than looking to the FAA for uniform enforcement provisions. See supra
Part IV.A (discussing the Mitsubishi Motors test as applied to employment statutory
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Following clarification, Congress should further amend the FAA to
include provisions addressed to employment arbitration concerns. These
provisions would apply to employment arbitrations involving statutory
discrimination claims. Essentially, any amendments should address issues
raised in the parade of horribles and provide more palatable procedural
guidelines. First, predispute arbitration agreements must be in writing, must
contain a clear statement of the arbitral process as well as panel selection
procedures, and must be signed by the employee separately from the
remainder of the employment contract. 252 Employees should be placed on
notice concerning the dispute resolution process and what rights they are
consenting to arbitrate. While an explicit list of arbitrable rights should not be
necessary, 253 an enforceable arbitration provision should at least place an
employee on notice that, by signing, she agrees to submit her civil rights
claims to arbitration. 254 Additionally, the employee should be cognizant of
arbitral panel selection and the arbitration rules that will apply to the
process. 255 The "separate agreement" provision simply insures that an
discrimination claims). While such analysis will remain integral to employment arbitration
even with emendation, the state of the law, which requires courts to build a house of cards
by first conjecturing upon FAA inclusion before then conjecturing on statute arbitrability,
would collapse into more manageable propositions.
252 Predispute arbitration agreements encompass broader issues than arbitration
agreements that cover existing disputes. Within the employment context, in which contracts
generally are signed prior to employment, the scope and extent of arbitration is not
delineated by an existing dispute, but an expansive view toward what could occur. See
supra note 190 and accompanying text (detailing language of numerous employment
arbitration agreements).
Note that section 2 of the FAA states that all arbitration agreements that appear in
writing are valid "save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation
of any contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
253 See supra notes 166-168 and accompanying text (detailing the inquiry into whether
an arbitration agreement may go unenforced for failure to notify an employee of arbitrable
rights).
254 But see supra note 168. The general consensus is that a broadly written arbitration
provision covering all disputes arising out of the employment relation places an employee
on notice. See supra note 168.
255 Some argue that arbitration panel selection in employment arbitration should
require specific limitations. See Maltby, supra note 8, at 17-22. The authors believe that
(1) this specific process is best left to the arbitration rules that the parties agree upon, and
(2) any overreaching by an employer to stack the deck in his favor, or selection of biased
arbitrators, will be subject to the provisions of section 10 of the FAA. Otherwise, the FAA
would single out employment arbitrators as being particularly suspect, a seemingly
incongruous result given the confidence the FAA should instill in the arbitral process.
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arbitration clause is not buried within a contract or employee manual that a
less astute employee may not catch among the fine print.256
Second, the employee must knowingly and voluntarily sign the agreement
to arbitrate. 257 This requirement would address the concern raised in Lai and
seeks to provide that, in addition to notice requirements, the employer insures
that an employee is aware of and willing to sign the agreement. 258 Court
interpretations of knowing and voluntary should produce reasonable employer
practices without leaning toward extremism. For instance, the "specific
waiver" requirements of Lai are too stringent. Yet, courts that reject Lai have
been too lenient in charging parties with knowledge of their contract. 259 In
theory, a contract satisfying the notice provisions in the first proposal should
sufficiently collapse a knowing and voluntary inquiry to a single question of
employer disclosure. The provision, however, would remain vital in situations
in which an employee could demonstrate that an employer coerced the
arbitration agreement or in which the notice provision inquiry is at issue. 260
Third, at minimum, arbitration must promise the same substantive rights
and remedies afforded under the applicable statute or statutes in a court of
law. While this is an established judicial doctrine, the provision is not
codified. 261 Due to the general court acceptance of this provision, passage of
256 Once a contract is signed, the court presumes that the party has read and
understood the import of the agreement, regardless of whether the party has read the
contract or not. See Great W. Mortgage Corp. v. Peacock, 110 F.3d 222, 228-229 (3d Cir.
1997).
One concern, however, is that the enforceability of an arbitration agreement should not
be made to depend on the sole fact that the contract is one of arbitration. See Doctor's
Assocs., Inc., v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 686-688 (1996) (invalidating a state law that
required specific notice provisions that a contract involved arbitration, because this
requirement specifically targeted arbitration agreements and not all contracts).
257 See supra notes 166-168 and accompanying text (discussing the knowing and
voluntary waiver issue).
258 See supra notes 166-168. Lai's status as compelling persuasive authority is
questioned. See supra notes 166-168. Protection of the employee rights, particularly for
employees who may not be able to bargain for specific terms or even realize what they are
bargaining for, is an imperative concern.
259 See, e.g., Beauchamp v. Great W. Life Assurance Co., 918 F. Supp. 1091, 1098
(E.D. Mich. 1996) (rejecting Lai and instead charging the employee with knowledge of the
existence and scope of the arbitration agreement he signed).
260 But see supra notes 137, 212-214, 240 and accompanying text (discussing issues
of adhesion would fall within the language of sections 10 and 11 of the FAA that bars
enforcement where ordinary contract law would operate to avoid the contract).
261 See supra notes 61-62, 178 and accompanying text.
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this element would simply represent enactment of the Mitsubishi Motors
standard and provide explicit reference to the standard when denial of
statutory rights are at issue in arbitration.
Fourth, an arbitral panel must issue written awards, permit more than
minimal discovery, and state the reasons for deciding each issue as it did. 262
The first portion of this proposed requirement is the most problematic because
arbitrators have not had to issue written opinions and, in fact, have been
encouraged not to disclose their reasoning. 263 Employment arbitration,
however, involves strong public interests that may require greater emphasis
on decisional reasoning. 264 As such, a record of that reasoning provides
crucial insight into the arbitral process. Additionally, arbitration of public law
claims under discrimination statutes requires threshold discovery minimums
to assure that an employee will not be impaired in trying to prove her case,
particularly when an employer retains control over corporate records or
employs the witnesses who comprise the crux of an employee's essential
evidence.2 65
Finally, no unreasonable costs must be imposed on the employee as a
condition of access to arbitration, and the employee shall retain the right to be
represented by an attorney.2 66 While litigation requires a party to incur
numerous court and filing expenses, an employee should not be forced to pay
262 See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text (addressing issue of arbitration
procedures and written awards). But see supra note 27 and accompanying text (stating that
arbitrators are not required to submit written decisions).
263 Recall that the rationale for unwritten awards is to insulate awards from judicial
searches for any error that may appear in an arbitrator's reasoning and thus provide
grounds for an alteration of the award. See supra note 27.
264 While Congress may not have intended federal courts to provide the only forum
for resolution of statutory discrimination claims, the exact scope of the judiciary's role in
reviewing claims decided in other fora is unclear. See supra notes 89-93. Whether issuance
of written awards provides a meaningful and significant element to this role thus, too,
remains unclear. Given that the "no written award" rule arose to insulate awards from
appellate scrutiny and thereby preserve arbitral efficiency, the same goal of efficiency may
prove a lesser concern when juxtaposed with the public interest in deterring and ending
discriminatory practices.
265 But see supra note 217 (arguing that discovery in employment arbitration should
prove minimal given the stark nature of a claim and the ease of locating evidence that tends
to prove the case).
266 See supra note 170 and accompanying text. This requirement is in part mandated
by Cole in which an employee could not be required to pay the arbitral expenses under
employer mandated arbitration. See Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1485
(D.C. Cir. 1997); see also supra note 170. Whether this requirement compounds the
'repeat player" argument or encourages institutional bias in favor of the employer is an
unanswered question. See supra notes 207-211 (discussing the repeat player argument).
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arbitration fees that would appear unreasonable in light of litigation fees for
arguing a similar claim in court.267 Access should not be denied preemptively
on the basis of an employee's inability to pay arbitral fees. Further, employees
should retain the right to counsel representation in arbitration proceedings. 268
Enactment of these guidelines as a new section of the FAA devoted to
employment arbitration should assuage the concerns raised by detractors of the
process. While several of these requirements already exist in the case law, 269
they should receive explicit legislative endorsement as amendments to the
FAA. Additionally, the FAA should be amended to clarify that all nonunion
employment contracts are within its scope.270 Adding this clarification and the
proposed requirements should ensure that arbitration protects the substantive
rights of the complainant and should provide recognition of the divergence
between the functional concerns of employment and purely commercial
arbitration. While both employers and employees should enjoy the availability
of the efficiency benefit of arbitration, this benefit also must be balanced in
tandem with the public interest in ending certain discriminatory practices by
employers. A clarified and modified arbitral process, built by hybridizing
currently applicable commercial arbitration law, should remain viable. The
proposed recommendations would supplement the existing FAA framework
by molding it to the special situation.
267 The authors are not suggesting an adoption of the Cole decision, but rather that
aggregate fees for the arbitral process, not including attorney's fees, should not appear
unreasonable in relation to the aggregate judicial fees had the employee brought suit in
court. Additionally, the authors include certain fee practices, such as a minimum
prepayment of arbitrator's fees prior to arbitration, as possible unreasonable constraints on
access.
268 See Maltby, supra note 8, at 24 (arguing for comparable representation). Maltby
provides two alternatives to the representation issue when there is a mismatch of employee
and corporate counsel. First, an employer may have to bear the cost of employee's counsel.
Second, an employer may be allowed representation only by a person of comparable ability
to the employee's representative. See id. Overall, the goal is to prevent seasoned, high-
priced corporate counsel from having a competitive advantage over an employee who
cannot afford similar representation. See id. Beyond these alternatives, government
agencies also may provide an opportunity for employee representation.
269 See Cole, 105 F.3d at 1482.
270 Recall that, unlike the FAA, the Uniform Arbitration Act, which has been enacted
in substantially the same form in 33 states, provides explicitly that the UAA "applies to
arbitration agreements between employers and employees." UNi. ARBrrRATION AcT § 1,
7 U.L.A. 1, 1 (1997).
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V. CONCLUSION
Employment arbitration agreements have surged in popularity in reaction
to the Gilmer decision. Employment arbitrations occurred earlier in the
context of collective bargaining and were later applied to brokers in the
securities field as a condition of market certification. Today, individual
employees working in diverse fields face the prospect of arbitrating their legal
disputes and statutory rights against the employer. 271 While some
commentators still argue whether arbitration should ever be permitted in
statutory employee right contexts, the more demanding debate centers upon
how the legislature will accommodate the trend and yet protect substantive
rights without compromising the benefits of arbitral efficiency.
Although employment arbitration is a process that is similar to commercial
arbitration, it requires additional safeguards to protect the often precarious and
weak bargaining position of the employee. 272 While some members of the
105th Congress have advocated an outright ban on all predispute arbitration
agreements covering public law statutes, 273 this position, the authors believe,
is too radical, despite the need for efficacious employee protections. While
many employers may have an edge when negotiating employment agreements,
the legislature should not remove the arbitral choice from the employee
without recognizing that the employee, too, can benefit from arbitration. 274
271 See supra note 1.
272 See generally supra Part IV.
273 See Civil Rights Procedures Protection Act of 1997, S. 63, 105th Cong. (1997);
Civil Rights Procedures Protection Act of 1996, H.R. 983, 105th Cong. (1997). If passed,
the Act would alter the language of several civil rights statutes, including Title VII, the
ADA, and the ADEA, to permit arbitration only when parties voluntarily agree to such
after the dispute arises.
274 Employee interests in arbitration of public law rights include (1) reduced delay,
(2) court-like proceedings and remedies, (3) an opportunity for low income employees to
avoid the anxiety of full-scale litigation, and (4) a guaranteed hearing on the merits without
the complex procedural hurdles present in litigation. See Cremin v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 957 F. Supp. 1460, 1477-1478 (N.D. Ill. 1997); see also Berger,
supra note 7, at 695-696 (noting that arbitration provides an alternative to the high-cost
gridlock of litigation, which may fail to fully recompense the employee who has to wait in
line to argue).
Perhaps the most striking metaphor in favor of employment arbitration is one drawn
to highlight the high cost of litigation that an employee faces if he takes his claims to court:
"We now have the judicial equivalent of a Rolls Royce, a marvelous vehicle whose sole
imperfection is that it is so expensive that almost no one can afford to drive one, and most
people end up walking." Maltby, supra note 8, at 27.
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The legislature needs, as the modifications propose, to level the playing field
rather than canceling the game.
Commercial arbitration in nonemployment cases succeeds because its form
fits its function. In the interests of time, money, and privacy, arbitration
provides an alternative to belabored and more contentious litigation.
Employment discrimination disputes also arise in business contexts, but the
matters themselves are more personal and less commercial. Time, money, and
privacy are lesser concerns to discrimination in employment issues. Thus, the
goal of employment arbitration is to address statutory right vindication without
losing sight of those attributes of efficiency that have made arbitration a
valuable managerial tool. The attainment of this goal merely requires fitting
form to function by supplementing traditional commercial arbitration rather
than supplanting it in the employment context.

